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Solving the Puzzle of Corporate Governance of 
State-Owned Enterprises: The Path of the 
Temasek Model in Singapore and Lessons for 
China 
Christopher Chen*  
Abstract: The purpose of this Article is to examine the corporate governance of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the Asian context by empirically surveying the 
influence of Temasek Holdings, Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, on its 
portfolio of government-linked companies in Singapore. Overall, the Temasek 
model seems to be a promising one. This Article shows that the top listed 
government-linked companies in which Temasek has a stake have greater board 
independence than the other top listed companies in Singapore. This illustrates 
that a high quality of corporate governance could be aligned with public 
interests associated with SOEs. While this research offers hope for SOE 
reformers in China, the Article also argues that the need for strong public 
governance, the role of foreign activities and market forces, and the importance 
of a government’s desire to serve as a market leader are all underlying factors 
that make Temasek what it is today. Unfortunately, in the absence of those 
institutional factors, transplant of the Temasek model to other countries is 
unlikely to be entirely successful. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
The corporate governance of state-owned enterprises1 (SOEs) offers a 
puzzling irony. One might expect the state to lead by example since it 
imposes corporate governance rules on private enterprises whether by strict 
laws or voluntary codes.2 However, SOEs are generally not known for good 
corporate governance. It has been noted that “[SOEs] in many developing 
countries have been shown to be inefficient and ineffective.”3 Can we solve 
the puzzle? This is an important issue poised to take on enormous 
significance, as the reform of China’s gigantic SOEs—undermined by the 
“networked hierarchy”4 model—appears imminent.5  
In Asia, Singapore’s model of governing Temasek Holdings Pte. Ltd. 
(Temasek)—a well-known sovereign wealth fund6 that the Financial Times 
has described as “one of the world’s most influential investors”7—has been 
praised as a model for reform in China.8 Some academics have also called 
for the Temasekization (i.e., the management of a state-owned holding 
company modeled off of Temasek) of China’s State-owned Assets 
 
 1  There is no strict legal definition of a state-owned enterprise (SOE). The OECD loosely defines 
SOEs as “enterprises where the state has significant control, through full, majority, or significant 
minority ownership.” OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A SURVEY 
OF OECD COUNTRIES 183, http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/ 
corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprisesasurveyofoecdcountries.htm. This Article adopts this 
definition. 
 2  See generally Cally Jordan, Cadbury Twenty Years On, 58 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2013) (for general 
discussion on the use of corporate governance codes since the Cadbury Report in 1992). 
 3  James S. Ang & David K. Ding, Government Ownership and the Performance of Government-
linked Companies: The Case of Singapore, 16 J. MULTI. FIN. MANAG. 64, 72 (2006). 
 4  Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National) Champions: Understanding the 
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 706–14 (2013). 
 5  In November 2013 during the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the 
Chinese government announced its intention to reform the country’s SOEs to create a stable economy. 
See SOE Reform Essential to a Stable Economy, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 9, 2013), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013cpctps/2013-11/09/content_17093214.htm. 
 6  It has been noted that there is definitional uncertainty concerning different forms of state capital 
and sovereign wealth funds. George Gilligan & Megan Bowman, State Capital: Global and Australian 
Perspectives, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 597, 606–607 (2014). This Article uses the term “sovereign wealth 
fund” broadly without specifically defining it.  
 7  Javier Bias & Jeremy Grant, Temasek Widens its Africa Footprint, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/376372ba-c3e9-11e3-b2c3-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk# 
axzz38pWAD71K. 
 8  From SOE to GLC, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-
and-economics/21590562-chinas-rulers-look-singapore-tips-portfolio-management-soe-glc. See also Li 
Yang, Singapore’s Temasek to Be ‘Model’ for SOE Reform, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-01/28/content_17263195.htm. Singapore also seeks to export 
its management and governance experiences to other countries (such as teaching match or water 
treatment). Louise Lucas, Singapore Seeks to Export own Model, FIN. TIMES (July 29, 2015), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2adc8d68-20a6-11e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79.html#axzz3hLMwP65q. 
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Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) as a “possible 
pathway of change [for China] [as] a reorientation of the party-state in its 
role as a controlling shareholder.”9 The authors further argue that a 
“reorientation of SASAC toward the Temasek model would require a 
relaxation of party involvement in key managerial appointments and further 
devolution of control over the national champions to outside investors and 
independent directors.”10 However, does Temasek really impose good 
corporate governance standards on its domestic portfolio? Or is Temasek’s 
good image merely public relations puffery? In other words, can Chinese 
SOEs learn a lesson from Temasek? These questions remain unanswered in 
the current literature. This Article will attempt to address these questions 
while utilizing empirical data. This Article will also illuminate signs which 
demonstrate that large listed companies in which Temasek has stakes have 
higher corporate governance standards than other large listed companies in 
Singapore. While this may comfort critics of SOEs, this Article will show 
that the unique environment in Singapore makes Temasek a difficult model 
to duplicate. 
There could be a few explanations why corporate governance of SOEs 
is often poor. This has led to some international attention from the OECD 
entering the 21st century.11 First, the goal of state ownership may be in 
 
 9  Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 4, at 754.  
 10  Id. at 755. 
 11  In 2005, the OECD published a report concerning the governance of state-owned enterprises. 
OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (2005), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/ 
corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprisesasurveyofo 
ecdcountries.htm [hereinafter OECD 2005 REPORT]; OECD, GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (2005), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/ 
corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/corporategovernanceofstateownedenterprisesasurveyofoe 
cdcountries.htm. The 2005 Report was followed by an additional report in 2011 discussing the changes 
and reforms since 2005. OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: CHANGE AND 
REFORM IN OECD COUNTRIES (2011), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/corporate-governance-
of-state-owned-enterprises_9789264119529-en [hereinafter OECD 2011 REPORT]. Some also approach 
from the angle of the governance of sovereign wealth funds, which could be deployed as a vehicle to 
control SOEs. See Larry Cata Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (2010); Richard A Epstein & Amanda M Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds: The Virtues of Going Slow, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (2009); Oliver T. Gilbert, Global 
Analytical Lessons for Evaluating a Myanmar Sovereign Wealth Fund, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 579 
(2014); Amy Keller, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Trustworthy Investors or Vehicles of Strategic Ambition? 
An Assessment of the Benefits, Risks and Possible Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 7 GEO. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 333 (2009); Yvonne C.L. Lee, The Governance of Contemporary Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
6 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 197 (2010); Joseph J. Norton, Evolving Components of the New Bretton Woods II 
Post-Global Financial Crisis Architecture and Another Example of Ad Hoc Global Administrative 
Networking and Related “Soft” Rulemaking?, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 465 (2010); Paul Rose, 
Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REV. 83 (2008); Anthony Wong, Sovereign Wealth Funds and 
the Problem of Asymmetric Information: The Santiago Principles and International Regulations, 34 
BROOK J. INT’L L. 1081 (2009). 
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conflict with core corporate governance principles. As one scholar notes, 
“[t]he overarching question for the government owners of SOEs is why 
[they] have to be owned by the state.”12 The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) identifies three main goals of the 
state ownership of enterprises:13 to sustain or boost certain industries,14 to 
boost the economy,15 and to achieve fiscal or redistributive objectives.16 
Other rationales for state ownership include: maintaining natural 
monopolies or incumbent public service operators (e.g., the post office in 
many countries), or achieving industrial policies and development 
strategies.17 National security may also be a concern (e.g., of a firm 
manufacturing fighter jets). Those public interests may divert a manager’s 
goal from shareholder wealth maximization to the interests of certain 
groups (e.g., social minority or employees).18 Therefore, agency costs may 
be higher for small shareholders. Finding a way to balance an SOE’s public 
objectives with its commercial goals is thus an important but difficult 
issue.19  
Second, the state often plays a conflicting role regarding SOEs as it 
acts both as a regulator and a shareholder.20 As a regulator, the state should 
be accountable to its citizens and should serve the public interest with 
regard to rule-making and enforcement. As a shareholder, in contrast, the 
state should be interested in enhancing the value of its investment. The two 
roles could be in conflict. For example, in China, a state-owned bank has 
been asked to extend credit to several companies to rescue the economy.21 
 
 12  Hans Christiansen, Balancing Commercial and Non-commercial Priorities of State-owned 
Enterprises 6 (OECD Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 6, 2013), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/balancing-commercial-and-non-commercial-priorities-of-state-owned-
enterprises_5k4dkhztkp9r-en. 
 13  OECD 2005 REPORT, supra note 11, at 21. 
 14  Through SOEs, the state can help to sustain or control the decline of industries crucial to the 
economy or support emerging industries, in contrast to the private sector, which is less equipped to cope 
with the high risk and huge costs involved. Id. 
 15  In particular, the state could use SOEs to boost economy in less developed areas and pursue 
social goals (e.g., equality) through investments in infrastructure. Id. 
 16  For example, the state may invest in certain sectors to impose monopoly prices and thereby 
contribute to fiscal income or, in contrast, to reduce prices as a form of subsidy. OECD 2005 REPORT, 
supra note 11, at 21. 
 17  Christiansen, supra note 12, at 6–7. 
 18  Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 539, 543, 550–53 (2000). 
 19  For a general discussion of the balance between the commercial and non-commercial goals of 
SOEs in Hungary, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway, see Christiansen, supra note 12.  
 20  Chien-Chung Lin, The Chinese Independent Director Mechanism under Changing Macro 
Political-economic Settings: A Review of its First Decade and Two Possible Models for the Future, 1 
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 263, 309 (2012). 
 21  Giant reality-check, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-
and-economics/21584331-four-worlds-biggest-lenders-must-face-some-nasty-truths-giant-reality-check. 
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A private bank could refuse to avoid endangering its capital base.22 In 
another example, Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance openly ousted Taishin (a 
privately-held financial group) from the management of Chang Hwa Bank 
(a bank partially owned by the state) in a proxy battle in 2014, some years 
after first allowing Taishin to hold significant stakes in Chang Hwa.23 As a 
shareholder, the Ministry of Finance has the right to compete for 
management. However, this also raises concerns of the soundness and 
fairness of the financial market when one arm of the state forced Taishin to 
surrender control after turning Chang Hwa back to profits, an issue which 
the financial regulator (the other arm of the state) should address. The dual 
roles of the state may also affect the enforcement of corporate governance 
rules (e.g., removing a government official—acting in his capacity as a 
director—for breach of duties) as one arm of the state (as regulator) may be 
less likely to enforce rules against another arm for political or other reasons. 
Moreover, there is also the possibility that the government will give 
SOEs preferential treatment, which may distort market competition and 
hinder market efficiency. For example, it has been commented that 
“Chinese SOEs have been instrumental in advancing the government’s 
national goals . . . . However, SOEs have been far less prominent in keeping 
prices low and ensuring social equality.”24 The situation has led to some 
Chinese SOEs venturing into real estate simply to reap excessive profits, 
creating a real-estate bubble in the process.25 It has been further argued that 
the desire to have national champions on the global stage—as well as 
entrenched relationships between the government, the Communist Party, 
and other interested parties—may prompt the Chinese government to 
devote more resources to SOEs, thereby leading to “Chinese corporate 
groupism.”26  
Third, unlike many private firms, an SOE may face less pressure from 
private investors or financiers.27 The lack of external monitoring would 
provide less incentive for SOEs to improve its corporate governance in 
order to enhance its value and credibility.28 It is also much less likely to 
have a proper market for corporate control if a target company is owned by 
 
 22  Assaf Hamdani & Ehud Kamar, Hidden Government Influence over Privatized Banks, 13 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 567, 590 (2012). 
 23  Editorial: Chang Hwa Win Highlights Problems, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 15, 2015), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2014/12/15/2003606755.  
 24  Zhaofeng Wang, Corporate Governance under State Control: The Chinese Experience, 13 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 487, 499 (2012). 
 25  See id. 
 26  See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 4, at 712. 
 27  See Stavros Gadinis, Can Company Disclosure Discipline State-Appointed Managers? Evidence 
from Greek Privatization, 13 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 525, 527 (2012). Competition for finance may 
facilitate investors to control agency costs. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 283 
(2006). 
 28  See Gadinis, supra note 27, at 527. 
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the state, raising the possibility of higher agency costs.29 Moreover, SOEs 
often enjoy a monopoly in the domestic market, which may contribute to 
higher agency costs and poorer corporate governance.30 Thus, some argue 
that the complete privatization of SOEs would likely result in better 
performance.31 In a way, “having other shareholders introduces market 
pressures and may become an important means of monitoring SOE 
management.”32 However, whether partial privatization would work well is 
still a contentious issue.33 It is also hard to determine how private investors 
and the state will interact with each other in the long run. Even within the 
OECD, countries have different policies and practices.34 For example, some 
countries (e.g., France and New Zealand) adopted a centralized model to 
arrange a unit within an existing ministry to be responsible for the overall 
management of privatization agenda, while others chose a decentralized 
model or had a sectorial ministry responsible for the process of 
privatization.35 How far privatization can work should require further 
empirical survey in a given context. 
Fourth, state dominance of an SOE may also render certain internal 
supervisory mechanisms ineffective. For example, there are suspicions that 
a board of supervisors prescribed by China’s company law may not be 
effective in monitoring the performance of a board of directors, as the state 
(which is the controlling shareholder) may control both boards, thereby 
rendering the supervisory mechanism dysfunctional.36 
Finally, the state as a dominant shareholder may also bully minority 
shareholder, raising concerns for shareholder protection. As the OECD 
observed, “[a]s a dominant shareholder, the state may be in a position to 
abuse minority shareholders as it is able to make decisions in [general 
meetings] without the approval of minority shareholders [and] [i]t is also 
usually in a position to control the board’s composition.”37 Even if a SOE 
has been privatized, this is no guarantee that the state would relinquish 
control.38 Due process issues may also surface. For example, a regulator 
 
 29  Roe, supra note 18, at 558; Gadinis, supra note 27, at 528, 535. 
 30  See Mark J. Roe, Rents and Their Corporate Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1468, 1472–
73 (2001). 
 31  Gadinis, supra note 27, at 533. 
 32  OECD 2005 REPORT, supra note 11, at 70. 
 33  See generally Gadinis, supra note 27; Mariana Pargendler, The Unintended Consequences of 
State Ownership: The Brazilian Experience, 13 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 503 (2012). 
 34  See generally OECD, PRIVATISING STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: AN OVERVIEW OF POLICIES 
AND PRACTICES IN OECD COUNTRIES (2003), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/privatising-
state-owned-enterprises_9789264104099-en (discussing the general privatization policies and practices 
in OECD countries). 
 35  Id. at 53–58. 
 36  See Lin, supra note 20, at 297. 
 37  OECD 2005 REPORT, supra note 11, at 70. 
 38  For example, research in Israel shows that the Israeli government sold the shares of state-owned 
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may use its power as a majority shareholder to force an inadequate director 
to step down without opening a formal inquiry or to keep an unfit director 
in office because of his relationship with the government. Although such 
actions may save regulatory costs and increase confidentiality,39 these 
actions should arguably be more transparent for the sake of the public 
interest. Finding a way to ensure the proper management of an SOE to 
benefit the long-term interests of its shareholders (including the state) rather 
than allowing it to become trapped in the short-termism of corporate profit-
making40 is an issue worthy of discussion. 
Then, would there be any hope to improve corporate governance of 
SOEs? Academics have long debated on the cause of concentrated 
ownership and its impact on corporate governance, firm value, or other 
issues.41 The “law and finance” literature has suggested that the legal origin 
(i.e., whether a country belongs to common law, civil law or other legal 
systems) might explain ownership structure and corporate governance,42 
though it has been criticized that legal origin is not the foundation of better 
shareholder protection and supporting institutions.43 In addition, the path 
dependence theory suggests that “a country’s pattern of ownership 
structures at any point in time depends partly on the patterns it had 
earlier.”44 From this view, the corporate governance of companies in a 
country, including SOEs, would be shaped by the social, political and 
economic background of the country.45 Thus, the path for corporate 
governance of SOEs may differ if underlying conditions are different.  
On this basis, Singapore offers an interesting case study. On the one 
hand, Singapore inherits English common law tradition so that the legal 
 
banks in a block to just a few investors to preserve its influence over the newly privatized bank. 
Hamdani & Kamar, supra note 22, at 579. Research on the privatization of SOEs in Brazil also suggests 
that the Brazilian government prefers whole ownership to partial ownership, and therefore that the state 
lacks interest in dealing with the various governing rules in corporate and securities law. Pargendler, 
supra note 33, at 521–22. 
 39  See Hamdani & Kamar, supra note 22, at 580–81. 
 40  See generally Lynne L Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 
37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012) (for a general discussion of the financial crisis and why financial and non-
financial firms engage in short-termism). 
 41  See, e.g., Joseph P.H. Fan & T.J. Wong, Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness 
of Accounting Earnings in East Asia, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 401 (2002); Michael L. Lemmon & Karl V. 
Lins, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian 
Financial Crisis, 58 J. FIN. 1445 (2003). 
 42  See e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1115–16 (1998); 
Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 505 (1999). 
 43  See Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Market, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460, 
462–66 (2006). 
 44  Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership 
and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (1999). 
 45  See generally Roe, supra note 18 (discussing political preconditions to diffuse ownership in the 
US and concentrated ownership in some European countries). 
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system should provide some institutional support for good corporate 
governance if we follow the law and finance literature. On the other hand, 
although Singapore’s economy is still dominated by the state via Temasek 
and its portfolio of government-linked companies (GLCs), many of those 
GLCs have global operations (rather than just enjoying domestic dominance 
like many SOEs in the world) so that at least some of those firms do face 
pressure from domestic or overseas markets that may force them to raise 
their standards rather than hiding behind a veil of public-ness.46 In addition, 
Singapore has a known kiasu (i.e., fear to lose out) culture47 that drives not 
only students and teachers to compete to have higher grades48 but also the 
government to stay as competitive as possible, resulting in Singapore being 
ranked high on many global rankings.49 Those factors may lead up to a path 
that SOEs in Singapore under the Temasek model have to maintain good 
corporate governance practice to maintain competitiveness. If this is the 
case, the praise for the Temasek model may be justified. However, the 
subsequent question would be whether the path in Singapore offers any 
useful lessons for other countries, notably China. 
 In this Article, we will conduct an empirical survey of the corporate 
governance of top listed SOEs in the Singapore Exchange (SGX) that are 
linked to Temasek, drawing on information disclosed in the 2013 annual 
reports of the companies concerned50 and on Temasek’s own annual reports 
for 2013 and 2014.51 Though our sample is limited to big listed companies 
and thus there should be some bias, our data will show that companies 
controlled by Temasek do seem to have higher corporate governance 
standards (e.g., having a higher proportion of independent directors or 
separation of roles between the chairman and chief executive officer) than 
other top listed firms on SGX in terms of board composition over which 
 
 46  Competition in product market may provide some restraints on managerial behavior. JEAN 
TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 28–29 (2006). However, it has also been argued that 
product market does not perfectly control agency costs. Roe, supra note 30, at 1473. 
 47  “Kiasu” has been identified as the top value perceived by Singapore residents. Robin Chan, 
S’pore is Kiasu and Elitist, Survey Finds; Respondents Want a Society that Has Affordable Housing and 
Cares for Ederly, THE STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 24, 2012. 
 48  See, e.g., Neville John Ellis, Afraid to Lose Out: The Impact of Kiasuism on Practitioner 
Research in Singapore Schools, 22 EDUC. ACTION RES. 235 (2014) (discussing generally the impact of 
kiasuism on schoolteachers’ work as researchers).  
 49  See infra Part IV.A. 
 50  See SGX Annual Reports, SINGAPORE EXCHANGE, http://www.sgx.com/wps/portal/sgxweb/ 
home/company_disclosure/annual_financial (last visited Nov. 6, 2015). The annual reports of companies 
listed on the Singapore Exchange can be downloaded from the SGX website. 
 51  See TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2013 (2013), 
http://www.temasek.com.sg/documents/download/downloads/20130704205649/TR2013_Eng.pdf. (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2015); TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014 (2014), http://www.temasek.com.sg/ 
documents/download/downloads/20140707170404/Temasek-Review-2014-En.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 
2015). Temasek Reviews can be accessed from the Temasek Holdings website. 
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Temasek does not exert control. However, we will also show that there are 
some institutional factors that make Temasek what it is today. 
Unfortunately, those factors are difficult to replicate in other countries 
without significant structural changes.  
In the following parts, we first introduce the path and governance 
structure of Temasek, its domestic portfolio, and Singapore’s concept of 
government-linked companies. In Part III, we present data on the corporate 
governance of the domestic companies linked to Temasek and that of other 
top listed firms. Based on the discussion in Parts II and III, we then 
consider the lessons that can be learned from Singapore’s Temasek model 
and some of its underlying institutional factors and whether it is feasible to 
transplant that model to other Asian economies. Part V concludes the 
Article. 
 II. THE PATH OF SINGAPORE’S TEMASEK HOLDINGS 
 A. Creation of Temasek  
Incorporated in 1974, Temasek is one of two sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs) in Singapore, the other being GIC Private Limited (GIC).52 Both 
are designated “government companies” in Singapore’s Constitution.53 The 
main difference between the two SWFs is that GIC “does not own assets 
and only manages assets and foreign reserves on behalf of the Singapore 
Government,”54 whereas Temasek has owned and managed its own 
investments and assets since receiving initial seeding (valued at about SGD 
354 million at the time) at inception and certain assets from the government 
in the 1990s.55 Temasek’s initial portfolio comprised thirty-five companies, 
but only twelve currently remain under its control.56 
In theory, there are two broad SWF models: the manager model, where 
the legal owner of the pool of funds gives a mandate to an asset manager, 
and the investment company model, where the government as owner sets up 
an investment company that in turn owns the assets of the fund.57 The 
International Monetary Fund notes that the investment company model is 
 
 52  See generally Press Release, GIC Private Ltd., Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 
Private Limited Is now GIC Private Limited (July 23, 2013), http://www.gic.com.sg/ 
index.php/newsroom?id=127&Itemid=159). The company was known as Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation Pte. Ltd. before changing its name to GIC Pte Ltd. in July 2013. 
 53  Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Aug. 9, 1965) s 1/63, Fifth Schedule, Part II. 
 54  Lee, supra note 11, at 229. 
 55  TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 18. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Abdullah Al-Hassan, Michael Papaioannou, Martin Skancke, & Cheng Chih Sung, Sovereign 
Wealth Funds: Aspects of Governance Structures and Investment Management 10 (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. 13/231, 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13231.pdf. 
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“typically employed when the investment strategy implies more 
concentrated investments and active ownership in individual companies.”58 
In Singapore’s case, GIC is an example of the manager model,59 
whereas Temasek, which serves as the investment arm of the Singaporean 
government, is an example of the investment company model.60 Unlike 
Temasek, GIC is presided over by the Prime Minister with a number of 
government ministers on its board.61 In contrast, Temasek experiences 
much less state control in terms of board composition.62 The differences 
might be partly explained by the fact that GIC manages the city-state’s vast 
foreign reserves, whereas Temasek is more like a commercial arm of the 
state. While all SOEs and SWFs should serve some public missions, GIC’s 
goal apparently has a much stronger political implication than Temasek’s. 
The underlying rationale for Temasek’s creation in 1974 comprised 
“the idea that the Government should not be involved in [the] management 
of businesses” and the belief that “the Government and civil servants should 
focus on policy.”63 Therefore, the Singaporean government has separated 
the roles of the regulator and the investor from the very beginning, which 
may help to alleviate concerns over the conflicting roles played by the 
government in terms of the SOEs. The Temasek Charter also positions the 
company as an active investor and shareholder, forward-looking institution, 
and trusted steward.64 
According to its 2014 annual review report, Temasek controls more 
than SGD 223 billion (about USD 180 billion) in its investment portfolio, 
and has enjoyed a 9% compound annual return over the past decade and a 
16% growth rate since its inception in 1974.65 The report also informs us 
that Temasek made investments worth SGD 24 billion (about USD 19 
billion) in 2014 alone and investments worth SGD180 billion over the past 
decade.66 The company invests not only in Singapore (which accounts for 
31% of its portfolio) but also in many other parts of the world, including 
Asia ex-Singapore (41% of its portfolio), Europe, North America, Australia, 
and New Zealand (24% of its portfolio combined).67 Temasek focuses on 
 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  See supra note 54. 
 61  See About GIC, GIC PRIVATE LTD., http://www.gic.com.sg/index.php/about-gic/corporate-
goverance (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
 62  See infra Part II.C for the composition of the Temasek board. 
 63  Growing Temasek into A Distinct and Unique Enterprises, STRAITS TIMES, July 24, 2013, at 
A29; see also Press Release, Temasek, Transcript: Remarks by Chairman of Temasek, Mr. S. 
Dhanabalan, to Singapore Media (July 23, 2013), http://www.temasek.com.sg/mediacentre/ 
newsreleases?detailid=19992 [hereinafter Temasek Press Release]. 
 64  TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2013, supra note 51, at 5. 
 65  TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 6–7. 
 66  Id. at 6. 
 67  Id. at 8. 
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three main industry sectors: financial services (about 30%); 
telecommunications, media, and technology (23%); and transport (20%).68 
Starting with its 2013 annual report, Temasek took the rare move of 
disclosing the biggest names in its portfolio, more than one-quarter of 
which is concentrated on three companies: Singapore Telecommunications 
(about 14% of the portfolio), China Construction Bank (about 8%), and 
Standard Chartered (about 7%).69 The latter was replaced by the DBS 
Group (about 5%) in 2014.70 
 B. From SOEs to GLCs: Temasek’s Domestic Portfolio 
It is interesting to note how Temasek controls domestic industries in 
order to understand more of Temasek’s role in Singapore’s economy. In 
general, the 2005 OECD Report identifies three models of state 
ownership71: the decentralized or sector model, the dual model, and the 
centralized model.72 The decentralized model, in which the responsibility 
for controlling the SOEs lies with the relevant sector ministries, is the most 
conventional.73 However, the OECD notes that the most prevalent is the 
dual model, under which responsibility for controlling the SOEs is shared 
by a sector ministry and a central entity (e.g., the finance ministry).74 Under 
the centralized model, “ownership responsibility is centralized under one 
main ministry.”75  
Temasek follows the centralized model. On the one hand, Temasek is 
fully owned by the Ministry of Finance,76 and no other government ministry 
or agency owned shares in companies invested by Temasek.77 On the other 
hand, it is not new that a government would establish one or more holding 
companies to manage SOEs. The OECD notes that “[t]his holding 
 
 68  Id. at 9. 
 69  TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2013, supra note 51, at 42. 
 70  TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 30. 
 71  Conceptually, the models for state ownership are different from those for sovereign wealth funds 
(SWF). The former considers how a state controls SOEs, while the latter deals with how a state sets up a 
SWF, which may or may not control domestic SOEs. In Singapore’s case, government-linked companies 
are held solely through Temasek. Thus, there is an overlap between the two sets of classification. 
 72  OECD 2005 REPORT, supra note 11, at 42. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id.  
 75  Id. 
 76  TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 64. 
 77 See generally SINGAPORE AIRLINES, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013/14 152 (2014), 
http://www.singaporeair.com/jsp/cms/en_UK/global_header/annualreport.jsp. In order to comply with 
the Air Service Agreements between Singapore and other countries, Singapore Airlines (as the national 
flag carrier) should at all times be effectively controlled and substantially owned by Singapore nationals. 
For this purpose, the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Singapore holds one non-tradable special 
share, which gives the Ministry a right to veto certain matters. 
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organisation has often resulted from reforms undertaken mainly in the 
1970’s, aimed at decreasing political interference in the management of 
SOEs, giving more flexibility to their management vis-à-vis usual public 
management rules, and finally tougher budget constraints.”78 In a way, we 
may view Temasek (also created in the 1970s) as a result of such policy 
thinking. 
There is no doubt that Singapore maintained significant control over 
the city-state’s key industries via Temasek, as Table 1 shows. 
  
 
 78  OECD 2005 REPORT, supra note 11, at 59–60. 
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TABLE 1: TEMASEK HOLDINGS AND MAJOR INDUSTRIES IN SINGAPORE79 
 
Industry and Companies Temasek’s Direct 
Ownership Interest 
Note 
Utilities 
CitySpring Infrastructure Trust 
(gas) 
37.41%a Listed on SGX 
Singapore Power 100% Unlisted 
Transport 
Singapore Airlines 55.95% Listed on SGX 
SIA Engineering 78.05%a Listed on SGX 
SMRT (public transport) 54.2% Listed on SGX 
PSA Int’l Pte. Ltd. (port) 100% Unlisted 
Neptune Orient Lines (shipping) 25.91% Listed on SGX 
SATS (airport services) 42.98% a Listed on SGX 
Media 
MediaCorp Pte. Ltd. 100% Unlisted 
Financial and Commodity Trading 
DBS Group Holdings 11.6% Listed on SGX 
Olam International 24.07% Listed on SGX 
Telecommunications 
Singapore Telecommunications 51.88% Listed on SGX 
Starhub 56.5%a Listed on SGX 
M1 19.39%a Listed on SGX 
Manufacturing and Heavy Industries 
Keppel Corp. 20.47% Listed on SGX 
Sembcorp Industries 48.85% Listed on SGX 
Sembcorp Marine 60.82% a Listed on SGX 
Real Estate and Other 
Wildlife Reserves Singapore Pte. 
Ltd. 
88% Unlisted 
CapitaLand Ltd. 39.53% Listed on SGX 
Mapletree Investments Pte. Ltd. 
 
100% Unlisted80 
Ascott Residential Trust 46.92% a Listed on SGX 
Keppel Land 54.65% Listed on SGX 
a. Deemed interests.81 
 
 79  The data are based on each company’s annual report for 2013. 
 80  Although Mapletree Investments Pte Ltd. is not a listed company, it controls several real estate 
investment trusts that are listed on the SGX, including Mapletree Commercial Trust, Mapletree 
Industrial Trust, Mapletree Logistics Trust, and Mapletree Greater China Trust. 
 81  A “deemed interest” represents indirect ownership interests in a company’s shares. Under 
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 For clarity, throughout the Article we use “stake” to refer to 
Temasek’s total interests (including both its direct ownership and indirect 
deemed interests) and “direct interests” or “owning shares” when Temasek 
is a shareholder of a firm. For convenience, we use the terms “companies” 
and “firms” interchangeably. However, we should note that some firms 
listed on the SGX or invested in by Temasek take the form of business 
trusts (notably real estate investment trusts), which are not themselves 
structured as companies but normally are managed by a management 
company. 
For the most part, domestic firms in which Temasek holds a stake are 
no different from the usual SOE suspects seen in other countries. In effect, 
the Singapore government controls key industries or utilities solely through 
the state-owned holding company. Singapore’s sole power company, 
Singapore Power, remains under the absolute control of Temasek. In the 
media realm, Temasek enjoys absolute control over the sole producer of 
terrestrial television programs. Temasek also exercises significant control 
over public transport and shipping. It has majority control over Singapore 
Airlines, the flag carrier, and SMRT, Singapore’s largest public transport 
operator. It also holds a stake in a shipping company and enjoys absolute 
control over the operator of the Port of Singapore. In fact, the company also 
holds a stake in Hutchison Port Holdings Trust, one of the operators of the 
Port of Hong Kong.82  
In the financial sector, Temasek has a substantial stake in the DBS 
Group, although it does not appear to have stakes in the other two local 
banking groups.83 However, this does not mean that Temasek is not 
interested in the financial sector. It holds substantial stakes in Standard 
Chartered, a British bank with significant business interests in Asia, and 
 
Singapore law, a person is deemed to be interested in the shares of a company if he or she has certain 
connections to those shares. For example, a person (A) may be deemed to be interested in the shares of a 
company (Co. B) in the following situations: (1) A has the authority to dispose of the shares of Co. B; 
(2) A holds beneficial interests in the shares of Co. B (e.g., A is the beneficiary of a trust that holds the 
shares as trust assets); (3) A controls a third party (C) that has control over Co. B; (4) A controls more 
than 20% of C, which holds some shares in Co. B; and (5) A has a contract (including an option) or 
holds a right to purchase the shares of Co. B.  See Companies Act (Cap 50, 2002 Rev Ed) s 7. In other 
words, the concept of “deemed interest” represents a person’s indirect shareholding in the company. A 
person must disclose to a company whether his or her direct or indirect interests together amount to 
more than 5% of the company’s outstanding shares. See Companies Act (Cap 50, 2002 Rev Ed) ss 81, 
82. 
 82  Although it is listed in Singapore, the HPH Trust is effectively controlled by Li Ka Shing—a 
Hong Kong tycoon. 
 83  Pursuant to the Monetary Authority of Singapore, there are currently five local banks including 
DBS, Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC), Bank of Singapore (which is part of the OCBC 
group), United Overseas Bank (UOB), and Far Eastern Bank (which is part of the UOB group). 
Financial Directory, MONETARY AUTH. OF SINGAPORE, https://masnetsvc.mas.gov.sg/FID.html. Thus, 
there are three local banking groups in Singapore. 
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China Construction Bank, one of the four largest state-owned banks in 
China.84 Although Temasek does not seem to hold a stake in any of the 
major domestic insurers, it does have a stake in several foreign insurance 
companies, including AIA (listed in Hong Kong) and Ping An.85 The latter 
is considered to be one of the nine most important insurance companies in 
the world.86  
The telecommunications sector presents a curious case. Temasek holds 
the majority of shares in Singapore Telecommunications (SingTel), and it 
also has deemed interests in the shares of the other two telecoms firms in 
Singapore—Starhub and M1—via its direct shareholding in other 
companies.87 Thus, Temasek has significant direct or indirect stakes in all 
three telecoms in Singapore, leaving the local market without a true private 
player. It is also interesting to note that Temasek does not attempt to let 
SingTel monopolize the market, allowing Starhub (of which Temasek owns 
over 50% indirect shareholding interests) to be in fierce competition with 
SingTel over the provision of mobile and cable TV services in Singapore.  
Several of the companies in which Temasek has a stake are regional or 
even global leaders in their fields. For example, DBS is the largest bank in 
Southeast Asia by assets,88 and SingTel is the region’s largest telecoms 
operator by revenue.89 With Sembcorp Marine and Keppel Corp., Temasek 
controls two of the world’s largest builders of jack-up rigs.90 In addition, 
Singapore Airlines is often ranked among the best airlines in the world.91 
There are a few other points to note about the companies associated 
with Temasek. First, most of them are listed firms, and are thus exposed to 
capital market regulations and to market pressure from institutional and/or 
individual shareholders. The companies in which Temasek has a stake 
function just like private enterprises, except that they are partly owned by 
 
 84  As of 2014, Temasek held 18% of the outstanding shares of Standard Chartered PLC and 6% of 
China Construction Bank. See TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 90. 
 85  According to its 2014 report, Temasek owns about a 4% stake in AIA (a large Hong Kong-listed 
insurer) and has raised its stakes in Ping An to 3%. See id. at 90. 
 86  Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs) and the Policy Measures That Will Apply to 
Them, FIN. STABILITY BD. (July 18, 2013), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ 
r_130718.pdf. 
 87  TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 93; STARHUB LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2013 
170 (2013), http://ir.starhub.com/FormBuilder/_Resource/_module/gZSLLgdlcU638zpQWaYGmQ/ 
file/SHL_AR2013_Full_Report.pdf; M1 LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2013 135 (2013), 
https://www.m1.com.sg/sites/AnnualReports/2013/assets/pdf/M1-Annual-Report-2013.pdf. 
 88  Jeremy Grant, Analysts Query Logic of Malaysia Three-Way Bank Merger, FIN. TIMES (July 13, 
2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9331446e-0a3e-11e4-a55e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz39mVHiSGd. 
 89  Jeremy Grant, SingTel Bulks Up in Digital Marketing, FIN. TIMES (June 11, 2014), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b843f43c-f106-11e3-9e26-00144feabdc0.html#axzz39mVHiSGd. 
 90  Jeremy Grant, Boon for Singapore’s Jack-Up Rig Builders, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2013), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2556e750-9910-11e2-bbd4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz39mVHiSGd. 
 91  See, e.g., The World’s 5-Star Airlines, SKYTRAX, http://www.airlinequality.com (last visited Oct. 
28, 2015).  
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the state via Temasek, which brings us to the concept of “government-
linked companies” (GLCs) in Singapore. Although changing the 
terminology does not alter the fact that the shares of GLCs are ultimately 
SOEs, it does downplay the state ownership element. The GLC concept 
underscores Singapore’s desire to control key domestic industries via 
Temasek without any overt intervention. 
Second, Temasek still maintains absolute control over some unlisted 
entities and the sole terrestrial media firm (which are often structured as 
private companies92). For example, it enjoys complete ownership of 
Singapore’s sole power company and of Wildlife Reserves Singapore Pte. 
Ltd., the operator of such local attractions as the zoo and the bird park. The 
reasons why those firms remain under Temasek’s absolute control may be 
due to political or policy reasons, though there is no public explanation why 
they have not been privatized. To a certain extent, Temasek can also be said 
to serve charitable objectives by contributing to the local community.93 
Third, several domestic companies owned by Temasek are also 
multinational enterprises. For example, SingTel has mobile customers not 
only in Singapore but also in Australia, India, and a few other countries in 
Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Therefore, Temasek’s strategic 
position extends beyond Singapore’s national borders.  
Fourth, the company also holds stakes in foreign companies.94 In 2013, 
Temasek made headlines by announcing an investment in Alibaba (a 
Chinese e-commerce giant) and its acquisition of a stake in the A.S. Watson 
Group (a retail chain selling pharmaceutical and cosmetic products) from Li 
Ka Shing, the richest man in Hong Kong.95 Interestingly, Temasek also 
holds a stake in several energy firms in North America.96 As Singapore 
produces no oil or natural gas, Temasek’s investment in foreign energy 
firms may have a strategic purpose beyond purely financial considerations. 
Such foreign investments mean that Temasek often has to comply with 
foreign laws in order to trade or maintain its investments. 
Fifth, Temasek often makes investments through a subsidiary. For 
example, Temasek’s stake in InTouch Holdings (a Thai telecom) is held 
 
 92  Under Singapore law, a company may be registered as a private company if its constitution 
restricts the right to transfer its shares and the company has no more than fifty shareholders. Companies 
Act (Cap 50, 2002 Rev Ed) s 18(1). 
 93  Temasek contributes to a number of philanthropic organizations. See TEMASEK, TEMASEK 
REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 69–71. 
 94  See, e.g., TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 90–97. 
 95  Watsons: Elementary, My Dear, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/ 
07ea0e32-b0e2-11e3-bbd4-00144feab7de.html#axzz39mVHiSGd; Jeremy Grant, Temasek Dented by 
China Shadow Banking Woes, FIN. TIMES (July 8, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9decc23a-066e-
11e4-8c0e-00144feab7de.html#axzz39mVHiSGd. 
 96  TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 96. 
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through a subsidiary holding company called Aspen Holdings Ltd.97 
Temasek thus functions quite like a private enterprise with regard to 
organizing its shareholdings and control structure.  
Finally, it is worth noting that Temasek does not invest only in the 
world’s blue chip companies but also provides venture capital funding to 
young start-ups not only in Singapore, but also in other countries. One 
report suggests that Temasek is behind a start-up firm designing a mobile 
app that helps users in Southeast Asia call a taxi via a venture capital arum 
called Vertex Ventures Holdings Ltd.98 Such reports certainly make 
Temasek’s role in its investment portfolio and exposure more interesting. 
 C. Organizational Structure and Regulation of Temasek 
According to the OECD 2005 Report, SOEs can take various legal 
forms, the most common of which within the OECD is the limited liability 
company. In some countries, however, an SOE can take the form of a 
public law institution.99 In addition, SOEs may be subject to special laws in 
some countries.100 The OECD notes that “SOEs with a specific legal status 
have often been distinguished by different provisions with respect to boards 
and the required level of disclosure” and are not subject to bankruptcy 
laws.101 Singapore’ GLCs all take the form of a limited liability company. 
One point worth noting is that Temasek’s management and operations 
are not built upon stringent rules. In fact, few Singapore laws regulate 
Temasek’s operations. This legal backdrop can be further analyzed from the 
angles of corporate and public law. At the corporate law level, Temasek is 
incorporated as a private company pursuant to Singapore’s Companies Act. 
Thus, it is not a creation of special laws, but rather a product of policy. 
Under the Companies Act, a company is eligible to register as a private 
company if its memorandum or articles of association restrict the rights of 
shareholders to transfer shares and its members number no more than 
fifty.102 This rule ensures that a private company is rather closed in nature. 
 
 97  As InTouch is listed in Thailand, it does not report “deemed interests” like in Singapore. 
However, in Temasek Review 2014, it does mention its investment in InTouch. See Shareholder 
Structure, INTOUCH CO., http://www.intouchcompany.com/Major%20Shareholdersen.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2015); TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 92. From a newspaper report, it 
has been reported that Aspen Holdings is fully owned by Temasek. Saeed Azhar & Denny Thomas, 
Update 1 – Temasek Seeks to Sell $3.1 Bln Stake in Thailand’s Shin Corp to SingTel – Sources, 
REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/temasek-shincorp-singtel-
idUSL3N0LM3YY20140218#lyfKumPCbwiJho28.97. 
 98  Ben Bland, Southeast Asia’s Answer to Uber, FIN. TIMES (June 24, 2014), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dbe630f2-f61b-11e3-a038-00144feabdc0.html#axzz38RZ8jYcy.  
 99  OECD 2005 REPORT, supra note 11, at 36. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 37. 
 102 Companies Act (Cap. 50, 2002 Rev Ed) s 18(1) (Sing.). 
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In addition, the government designates Temasek as an exempt private 
company,103 which means that it enjoys a variety of exemptions provided by 
Singapore company law, including greater flexibility in designing its voting 
structure,104 relief from the requirement to hold an annual general 
meeting,105 and the ability to pass a resolution by written means under 
certain conditions.106 As an exempt private company, Temasek may enjoy 
more freedom in lending money to its own directors or those of related 
companies.107 However, the biggest advantage Temasek enjoys as an 
exempt private company is that it need not file audited financial information 
to Singapore’s company registry.108 The result is that no one outside the 
company can access company financial statements other than those 
disclosed in the annual Temasek Review. 
At the public law level, the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 
ensures that “the appointment or removal of any person as a director or 
chief executive officer of any Government company . . . shall not be made 
unless the President, acting in his discretion, concurs with such appointment 
or removal.”109 Otherwise, an appointment is considered void.110 According 
to the Constitution, the President should consider the recommendations of 
the Council of Presidential Advisers. If he decides against the council’s 
advice to refuse to concur with an appointment, Parliament may overrule 
his decision with a resolution supported by no less than two-thirds of its 
elected members.111 The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the 
management of government companies such as Temasek and GIC pursue 
the public interest. It is also worth noting that the President must affirm the 
appointment of a director or CEO. Accordingly, the prime minister and 
other ministers have no constitutional power to intervene in the 
management of Temasek. To avoid exerting too great a political influence 
over that company’s operations and management, the government does not 
interfere with Temasek or any other company’s investment decisions. 
Although the President is constitutionally entitled to information related to 
Temasek in certain key areas, his power is reactionary and may be 
exercised “only when the government needs his concurrence to proceed.”112  
According to its 2014 Review Report, Temasek had ten directors on its 
board on March 31, 2014, with three new members to be added after March 
 
 103 See id. s 4 (defining “exempt private company”) 
 104 See id. s 64.  
 105 Id. s 175A. 
 106 Id. s 184A(1)–(2). 
 107 See id. ss 162, 163. 
 108 See id. s 197; Companies (Filing of Documents) Regulations (GN No S 17/2003) reg 38 (Sing.). 
 109 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) s 22(C)(1) (Sing.) 
 110 Id. s 22C(2)(b). 
 111 See id. s 22C(1A). 
 112 Lee, supra note 11, at 232–33. 
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31st.113 All of the directors had considerable business experience in 
Singapore, and three held ministerial or other government positions before 
joining Temasek.114 Apart from the chairman, Mr. Lim Boon Heng, who 
has served in the cabinet for eighteen years and thus has strong government 
connections, only one director served in the government immediately 
before joining Temasek.115 Most of the directors have been chairmen or 
executives of other large companies,116 and one of the three non-
Singaporeans on the board is the former Deputy Secretary of the U.S. State 
Department and a former U.S. trade representative.117 Although the 
majority of the board members are Singaporeans, the presence of a few 
non-Singaporeans demonstrates the globalization of Temasek and its 
business focus. 
Temasek claims that the majority of the board are “non-executive 
independent private sector business leaders.”118 Although it is unclear how 
many are actually independent directors, it appears that the CEO is the sole 
executive director.119 The company boasts that neither the President nor 
government of Singapore is involved in its “investment, divestment, or 
other business decisions except in relation to protection of Temasek’s own 
past reserves.”120 This claim strengthens Temasek’s status as an active and 
professional investor, as does its promise that its management adheres to a 
company Code of Conduct and Ethics—any violation of which is examined 
by the Audit Committee.121  
However, there are competing claims that Temasek’s decisions, 
including those concerning appointments to major positions in its first 
fifteen years of operation, have sometimes been made in close consultation 
with the government.122 If so, the early years of Temasek might have a 
stronger political interference. It has been suggested, though, that Temasek 
has become increasingly commercially-oriented since the appointment of 
Madam Ho Ching as CEO in January 2004, with key decisions now made 
primarily at the board level.123 Madam Ching is the wife of Singapore’s 
Prime Minister, suggesting that political influence may still exist even if it 
 
 113 TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 53 (showing two of the new members were 
to be added June 10, 2014 and the third new member would join January 1, 2015).  
 114 See Board of Directors, TEMASEK, http://www.temasek.com.sg/abouttemasek/boardofdirectors 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
 115 TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 54–56. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 55 (“Robert B. Zoellick”). 
 118 Id. at 50. 
 119 Id. at 53. What we can ascertain is that the four directors on the Audit Committee should be 
independent directors. Id. at 51. 
 120 TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 62.  
 121 Id. at 51–52. 
 122 Temasek Press Release, supra note 63. 
 123 Id. 
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is informal in nature. The situation also exposes the company to doubts over 
the true independence of its management and operations.124 
In addition to its board of directors, since 2004 Temasek has also 
created the Temasek International Panel, composed of members from a 
number of prominent international businesses and political positions (e.g., 
the former Australian Prime Minister and former CEO of Exxon Mobile) 
who offer their perspective on the global environment,125 and the Temasek 
Advisory Panel (made up of prominent businessmen, including the 
chairmen of several companies in which Temasek invests) to advise the 
board and senior management and to help shape the company’s global 
strategies.126 
It is unclear how much compensation Temasek directors receive. In its 
2014 Review Report, Temasek declares that the company’s base salaries 
reflect market benchmarks and that bonuses are driven by the performance 
of individuals, teams, and the company as a whole as a means to offer both 
short- and long-term incentives.127 Some bonuses can be deferred up to 
twelve years to account for the sustainability of returns over the market 
cycle.128 It is difficult to compare Temasek’s remuneration policy and 
practices for directors and management with those of private enterprises 
based purely on the company’s policy statement. However, its stated 
remuneration policy is more akin to that of a private enterprise than to an 
arm of the state, making it more like a business entity commonly seen in the 
market. Moreover, Temasek’s accounts, like those of all companies in 
Singapore, are subject to external audits. As disclosed in its annual review 
reports for 2014 and 2013, Temasek’s auditing firm is KPMG in 
Singapore.129 Such auditing by a reputable firm enhances Temasek’s 
transparency and accountability. In an attempt to further improve 
transparency, the company has voluntarily published an annual review since 
2004,130 a move that has probably helped it to advance in the transparency 
league table for SWFs.131 
 
 124 In contrast, GIC, Singapore’s other SWF, exhibits quite direct government intervention. The 
Prime Minister of Singapore serves as GIC’s chairman, and several other ministers sit on its board. See 
Corporate Governance, GIC PRIVATE LTD., http://www.gic.com.sg/index.php/about-gic/corporate-
goverance (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
 125 TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 76. 
 126  Id. at 77. 
 127 Id., at 45–46. 
 128 Id. at 45. 
 129 Id. at 80; TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2013, supra note 51, at 22. 
 130 Lee, supra note 11, at 231. The Temasek Reviews since 2004 could be downloaded from 
Temasek’s website: http://www.temasek.com.sg/investorrelations/investorlibrary/temasekreview. 
 131 Temasek is ranked among the top three companies in the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, 
published by the SWF Institute for the second quarter of 2013. See Linaburg-Madduell Transparency 
Index, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST., http://www.swfinstitute.org/statistics-research/linaburg-
maduell-transparency-index/. 
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In general, Temasek seems to be reasonably well-run, though the 
OECD observed that this type of organization (i.e., a state-owned holding 
company) “has led to excessive indebtedness and has not proven to be 
efficient either in terms of corporate restructuring or in financial 
management.”132 According to its annual review, Temasek has net debts of 
SGD 3.7 billion (about USD 2.85 billion) in 2014 while total assets 
amounted to SGD 319 billion (about USD 245 billion).133 Even in 2008 
when the net debt was at the highest level since 2005, it amounted to SGD 
33.8 billion (about USD 26 billion), while the total assets amounted to SGD 
295.5 billion (about USD 227 billion).134 The indebtedness of Temasek 
does not seem to be excessive. The Singaporean government appears 
content with allowing Temasek to run its portfolio of investments rather 
than using the company simply as a vehicle to control SOEs. In addition, as 
no strict government regulations have been applied to Temasek, the 
company has enjoyed some freedom to run its business (although it would 
be rather naïve to believe that it is entirely free of political influence). After 
all, Temasek manages the money of the Singaporean government and thus, 
the money of the Singaporean people. Accordingly, some degree of public 
supervision is appropriate.  
Overall, Temasek’s operation is in line with the OECD’s 
recommendation that “the government should not be involved in the day-to-
day management of SOEs and should allow them full operational autonomy 
to achieve their defined objectives.”135 As discussed further below,136 
Temasek does not normally appoint nominees or hold any preference shares 
to maintain control of the board of directors, nor is there any special 
bankruptcy regime designed specifically for Temasek or for GLCs in 
general. Both are subject to Singapore’s corporate law. Taken together, this 
evidence suggests that Singapore’s Temasek model is akin to a pure 
government-owned investment vehicle with other political, economic, or 
policy considerations mixed in. 
However, does this mean that the companies in which Temasek owns a 
stake operate in the same manner? Although we know what the state and 
these companies disclose about themselves, how Singapore’s GLCs 
perform in comparison with other listed firms in terms of corporate 
governance can be examined with hard data available in the public domain. 
It is to this task that we turn our attention. 
 
 132 OECD 2005 REPORT, supra note 11, at 60. 
 133 “Net debt” is defined as total debts less cash and cash equivalents. TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 
2014, supra note 51, at 83. 
 134 Id. 
 135 OECD 2005 REPORT, supra note 11, at 191. 
 136 See infra Part III.B. 
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 III. EMPIRICAL SURVEY OF TEMASEK’S INFLUENCE ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Our aim here is to determine whether the companies that Temasek 
holds a stake in have better or worse corporate governance structures than 
other firms. In this part, we first explain the scope of our empirical survey. 
We then analyze various indicators of good corporate governance, including 
the size of a company’s board of directors, its number of independent 
directors, the role of the chairman and CEO, remuneration issues, and 
committees. Finally, we explore whether the government gives SOEs 
preferential treatment.  
 A. Scope and Limit  
There are several dimensions to the scope of our empirical survey. 
First, it analyzes the annual reports of the fifty largest companies (by 
market capitalization) listed on the SGX in order to assess the corporate 
governance practices of Singapore’s top-listed firms. Based on the sample 
companies’ annual reports, we will be able to identify the names of 
directors, their nature (being executive, independent or non-independent 
non-executive director), the role they played in the company, committee 
membership, etc. This analysis affords a fairer assessment of Temasek’s 
influence on the country’s SOEs. Our list of the top fifty firms on the SGX 
comes from a publication issued by the exchange on April 17, 2014.137 
These fifty companies include all of the component stocks of the flagship 
Straits Times Index (STI)138 and MSCI Singapore Index as of June 1, 
2014139—representing the major components of Singapore’s stock market. 
Second, the survey also considers other unlisted or foreign firms 
invested in by Temasek. We rely on Temasek’s own disclosures in its 
annual review to acquire the list of companies in Temasek’s portfolio. It 
should be noted that this limits the sample because we have no concrete 
means of exploring Temasek’s complete portfolio, as the company 
regularly makes investment or divestment decisions. Accordingly, in this 
Article, we are only able to analyze Temasek’s potential influence on 
domestic firms. 
Third, for comparison purposes, we also use relevant data collected 
from the component stocks of Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index (HSI) and 
 
 137 See The 50 Largest Capitalised Stocks Listed on SGX, SINGAPORE EXCHANGE (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://www.sgx.com/wps/wcm/connect/sgx_en/home/newsflash/mu_17042014_1. 
 138 For the latest version of the components of the Straits Times Index, see ST Index, STRAITS 
TIMES, http://www.straitstimes.com/tags/st-index. 
 139 For the latest constituents of the MSCI Singapore Index, see Closing Index, MSCI, 
http://www.msci.com/eqb/custom_indexes/sg_performance.html. 
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those of the Taiwan 50 Index traded on the Taiwan Futures Exchange. The 
fifty component stocks of the HSI represent the top companies traded on the 
Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx), many of which are Mainland Chinese 
SOEs. The Taiwan 50 Index is also comprised of the fifty largest companies 
listed in Taiwan. Although it is beyond the scope of this research to analyze 
the ownership structure of SOEs in Hong Kong and Taiwan, relevant data 
on the top-listed firms in both markets allows for comparison of our data on 
Singapore and Temasek, as Hong Kong is a fierce competitor of Singapore 
in the Asia-Pacific region and Taiwan is one of the emerging economies of 
East Asia and, like Singapore, is dominated by the ethnic Chinese.  
Table 2 shows Temasek’s shareholdings in the top fifty companies on 
the SGX based on the 2013 annual reports of the companies concerned. The 
companies are listed in alphabetical order. 
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TABLE 2: TEMASEK SHAREHOLDINGS IN TOP 50 COMPANIES ON THE SGX 
AS OF 2013 
 
Company (indices) Registered 
place 
Direct 
Holdings 
Deemed 
Interests 
Total 
(Direct 
plus 
Deemed) 
Ascendas REIT (STI, 
MSCIii) 
Singapore Not 
substantial 
(NS)i 
NS NS 
CapitaCommercial Trust 
(MSCI) 
Singapore 0% 32.6% 32.6% 
CapitaLand (STI, MSCI) Singapore 39.53% 1.40% 40.93% 
CapitaMall Trust (STI, 
MSCI) 
Singapore 0% 28% 28% 
CapitaMalls Asia Singapore 0% 65.5% 65.58% 
China Merchants 
Property 
China NS NS NS 
City Developments (STI, 
MSCI) 
Singapore NS NS NS 
Comfort Delgro (STI, 
MSCI) 
Singapore NS NS NS 
Dairy Farm Bermuda NS NS NS 
DBS Group Holdings 
(STI, MSCI) 
Singapore 11.6% 17.68% 29.28% 
First Resources Singapore NS NS NS 
Fraser & Neave Singapore NS NS NS 
Fraser CentrePoint Trust Singapore NS NS NS 
Genting Hong Kong Bermuda NS NS NS 
Genting Singapore (STI, 
MSCI) 
Bermuda NS NS NS 
Global Logistics Property 
(STI, MSCI) 
Singapore NS NS NS 
Golden Agri-Resources 
(STI, MSCI) 
Bermuda NS NS NS 
Great Eastern Holdings Singapore NS NS NS 
Hong Kong Land 
Holdings (STI) 
Bermuda NS NS NS 
Hutchison Port Holdings 
Trust (STI, MSCI) 
Singapore 0% 11.01% 11.01% 
IHH Malaysia NS NS NS 
Jardine Cycle & Carriage 
(STI, MSCI) 
Singapore NS NS NS 
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Jardine Matheson 
Holdings (STI) 
Bermuda NS NS NS 
Jardine Strategic 
Holdings (STI) 
Bermuda NS NS NS 
Keppel Corp (STI, 
MSCI) 
Singapore 20.47% 0.69% 21.17% 
Keppel Land (MSCI) Singapore 0% 54.65% 54.65% 
Noble Group (STI, 
MSCI) 
Bermuda NS NS NS 
Overseas Chinese 
Banking Corp. (STI, 
MSCI) 
Singapore NS NS NS 
Olam International (STI, 
MSCI) 
Singapore 0% 24.07% 24.07% 
Prudential plc U.K. NS NS NS 
Sembcorp Industries 
(STI, MSCI) 
Singapore 48.85% 0.71% 49.56% 
Sembcorp Marine (STI, 
MSCI) 
Singapore 0% 60.82% 60.82% 
Shangri-La Asia Bermuda NS NS NS 
Singapore Airlines (STI, 
MSCI) 
Singapore 56.02% 0.06% 56.62% 
SIA Engineering (STI) Singapore 0% 78.43% 78.43% 
Singapore Exchange 
(STI, MSCI) 
Singapore NS NS NS 
Singapore Land Singapore NS NS NS 
Singapore Press Holdings 
(STI, MSCI) 
Singapore NS NS NS 
Singapore Technologies 
Engineering (STI, MSCI) 
Singapore 50.03% 0.38% 50.41% 
Singapore 
Telecommunications 
(STI, MSCI) 
Singapore 51.88% 0.06% 51.94% 
SP Ausnet Australia 0% 51.61% 51.61% 
Starhub (STI, MSCI) Singapore 0% 56.50% 56.50% 
Suntec REIT Singapore NS NS NS 
Thai Beverage (STI) Thailand NS NS NS 
Total Access Thailand NS NS NS 
United Industrial Corp. Singapore NS NS NS 
United Overseas Bank 
(STI, MSCI) 
Singapore NS NS NS 
United Overseas Land Singapore NS NS NS 
Wilmar International Singapore NS NS NS 
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(STI, MSCI) 
Yangzijiang Shipbuilding 
(MSCI) 
Singapore NS NS NS 
Notes: Under Singapore law, a shareholder has no obligation to disclose 
his or her interests if his or her total interest (including both direct and 
deemed interests) in the shares of the company is less than 5% of the 
company’s outstanding shares. Therefore, if a company’s annual report 
shows no Temasek’s interests, we assume that the latter’s stake is not 
substantial. However, it is not safe to assume that Temasek owns no 
shares in the company. STI denotes the Straits Times Index. MSCI 
denotes the MSCI Singapore Index. 
 
Temasek has a direct shareholding (above 5%) in seven of the fifty 
companies in Table 2, and owns more than 50% of the shares in three of 
them.140 If we also consider indirect interests, Temasek has a greater than 
5% stake in seventeen companies, including nine of which it has  a greater 
than 50% stake.141 Furthermore, we also identified forty-two other listed 
and unlisted companies in Singapore associated with Temasek, as shown in 
Table 3. Readers should be aware that this table does not constitute a 
comprehensive list of all of Temasek’s domestic investments. 
  
 
 140 The three companies are Singapore Telecommunications, Singapore Airlines, and Singapore 
Technologies Engineering. 
 141 The nine companies are Singapore Technologies Engineering, SP Ausnet, Singapore 
Telecommunications, Keppel Land, Starhub, Singapore Airlines, Sembcorp Marine, CapitaMalls Asia, 
and SIA Engineering. 
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TABLE 3: TEMASEK SHAREHOLDINGS IN SELECT DOMESTIC FIRMS AS OF 
2013 
 
Company (indices) Registered 
place 
Direct 
Holdings 
Deemed 
Interests 
Total 
(Direct 
plus 
Deemed) 
Ascott Residential Trusti Singapore 46.92% 0% 46.92% 
Asian Pay TV Trust Singapore 7.59% 0% 7.59% 
CapitaCommercial Trust 
(MSCI)i 
Singapore 0% 32.6% 32.6% 
CapitaLand (STI, MSCI) Singapore 39.53% 1.40% 40.93% 
CapitaMall Trust (STI, 
MSCI) i 
Singapore 0% 28% 28% 
CapitaMalls Asia i Singapore 0% 65.5% 65.58% 
Capita Retail China Trust i Singapore 0% 36.99% 36.99% 
City Spring Infrastructure 
Trust 
Singapore 0% 37.41% 37.41% 
DBS Group Holdings 
(STI, MSCI) 
Singapore 11.6% 17.68% 29.28% 
Hutchison Port Holdings 
Trust (STI, MSCI) 
Singapore 0% 11.01% 11.01% 
Keppel Corp (STI, MSCI) Singapore 20.47% 0.69% 21.17% 
Keppel Land (MSCI) Singapore 0% 54.65% 54.65% 
Keppel REIT Singapore 0% 46.57% 46.57% 
M+S Pte. Ltd. Singapore 40% 0 40% 
M1 Singapore 0% 19.39% 19.39% 
Mapletree Investments 
Pte. Ltd. 
Singapore 100% 100% 100% 
Mapletree Commercial 
Trustii 
Singapore 0% 38.77% 38.77% 
Mapletree Greater China 
Trustii 
Singapore 0% 34.24% 34.24% 
Mapletree Industrial 
Trustii 
Singapore 0% 30.52% 30.52% 
Mapletree Logistics 
Trustii 
Singapore 0% 40.88% 40.88% 
MediaCorp Singapore 100% 0% 100% 
Neptune Oriental Lines Singapore 15.91% 41.23% 57.14% 
Olam International (STI, 
MSCI) 
Singapore 0% 24.07% 24.07% 
PSA International Pte. 
Ltd. 
Singapore 100% 0% 100% 
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SATS Singapore 0% 43.03% 43.03% 
Sembcorp Industries (STI, 
MSCI) 
Singapore 48.85% 0.71% 49.56% 
Sembcorp Marine (STI, 
MSCI) 
Singapore 0% 60.82% 60.82% 
Singapore Airlines (STI, 
MSCI) 
Singapore 56.02% 0.06% 56.62% 
SIA Engineering (STI) Singapore 0% 78.43% 78.43% 
Singapore Technologies 
Engineering (STI, MSCI) 
Singapore 50.03% 0.38% 50.41% 
Singapore 
Telecommunications 
(STI, MSCI) 
Singapore 51.88% 0.06% 51.94% 
SMRT Singapore 54.2% 0.05% 54.25% 
Starhub (STI, MSCI) Singapore 0% 56.50% 56.50% 
STATS ChipPAC Singapore 0% 83.9% 83.9% 
Surbana Corp Pte. Ltd. Singapore 60% 0% 60% 
Notes:  
i. Indicates that Temasek has interests in these companies or trusts mainly 
through its holdings in CapitaLand Ltd., the firms’ parent company. 
ii. Indicates that Mapletree Investments Pte. Ltd. is the controlling holder 
of these real estate trusts. 
 
In addition, based on Temasek’s annual review for 2014,142 we 
compiled a list of the company’s major foreign investments, which are 
shown in alphabetical order in Table 4.  
 
 142 TEMASEK, TEMASEK REVIEW 2014, supra note 51, at 90–97. 
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TABLE 4: SHAREHOLDINGS OF TEMASEK’S MAJOR FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 
 
Company Country Temasek’s stakes (total 
interest in terms of % of 
outstanding shares) 
AIA Hong Kong 4% 
Alibaba China Unclear 
Bank of China China/Hong Kong <1% 
BG Group plc U.K. <1% 
Bharti Airtel India 3% 
Celltrion, Inc. South Korea 15% 
China Construction Bank China/Hong Kong 7.15% 
Evonik Industries AG Germany 5% 
FTS International, Inc. U.S. 41% 
Gilead Sciences, Inc. U.S. <1% 
ICBC China/Hong Kong 1.99% 
Kunlun Energy Co. Ltd. Hong Kong 1% 
Li & Fung Hong Kong 3% 
Lloyd’s Banking Group U.K. 1% 
Markit Group Holdings U.S. Unclear 
Ping An Insurance (Group) 
Co. 
China/Hong Kong 3% 
PT Bank Danamon 
Indonesia 
Indonesia 67.37% 
Pulau Indah Ventures Snd 
Bhd 
Malaysia 50% 
Repsol SA Spain 6% 
Shin Corp. plc Thailand 41.62% 
SP Ausnetii Australia 51.61% 
Standard Chartered Bank 
plc 
U.K. 18.06% 
The Mosaic Co. U.S. 5% 
Thermo Fisher Scientific, 
Inc. 
U.S. 1% 
Turquoise Hill Resources Canada 9% 
Notes: If we were unable to ascertain Temasek’s ownership interests 
from a company’s annual report, the number of shareholdings is based on 
the figures reported in Temasek Review 2014. SP Ausnet, although listed 
on the SGX, is an Australia-based power company controlled by 
Singapore Power, which is fully owned by Temasek. 
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Before we further examine a few corporate governance benchmarks, 
we should note that our study has some limitations. First, this research only 
focuses on bigger companies. Thus, the data may not be representative of 
every listed Singapore company across all ranges of market capitalization. 
Second, the selection of companies was not random. We drew the list of 
companies from the list of the top fifty by market capitalization and from 
Temasek’s own report. In short, what we will present is to compare the 
corporate governance practice of listed GLCs against that of other top listed 
companies in the Singapore market in order to examine the merit of the 
Temasek model. One should not overgeneralize our data.  
 B. Board Size and State Representation 
The composition and function of the board of directors constitute 
essential components of corporate governance practice. However, the 
presence of more directors does not necessarily indicate better corporate 
governance (or vice versa). The OECD recognized that “[d]etermining the 
right size of the board is an important issue with respect to promoting board 
efficiency,” though there is no one-size-fits-all approach.143 In this section, 
we focus on the size of the board and the amount of state representation. 
We then consider issues related to independent directors in the next two 
sections. The OECD 2005 Report recognizes that the overall board size in 
the SOEs of many countries is large, although reductions have been seen in 
recent years.144 In a follow-up study in 2013, the OECD noted that “a large 
number of OECD economies identify the optimum board size as 
somewhere between five and eight member[s],” though OECD does not 
provide an average board size of SOEs in OECD countries.145 Some 
countries, such as Korea, also impose limits on the size of SOE boards.146 
The report states that the degree of state representation on SOE boards 
internationally ranges from none—usually in SOEs following the 
centralized model such as those in Denmark or Norway—or just a couple of 
representatives (e.g., Swedish and German SOEs) to almost the entire 
board.147 Thus, there is no uniform standard for the amount of state 
representation on the board of an SOE. Some countries also require 
employee representation on the board148 or have created a special board 
nomination process or policy (e.g., Australia) to determine board 
 
 143 OECD, BOARDS OF DIRECTORS OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: AN OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL 
PRACTICES 76 (2013), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/board-of-directors-of-state-owned-
enterprises_9789264200425-en. [hereinafter OECD 2013 REPORT]. 
 144 OECD 2005 REPORT, supra note 11, at 123. 
 145 OECD 2013 REPORT, supra note 143, at 76–77. 
 146 OECD 2005 REPORT, supra note 11, at 123. 
 147 Id. at 123–124. 
 148 Id. at 124. 
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composition and/or state representation in an attempt to control political 
influence.149 For example, the Norwegian government claims that the state 
“actively contributed to the establishment of nomination committees in the 
listed companies. . . . In wholly state-owned companies, the work of 
composing boards is carried out in a structured manner by the ministry that 
manages the State’s ownership.”150 
In Singapore, there is no special law regulating Temasek or the 
companies it controls. Thus, the composition of the board is left for 
company law to decide. Under the Companies Act, there is no specific 
requirement for the size of a board of directors, as long as at least one 
director of each company is a resident of Singapore.151 For listed 
companies, the Code of Corporate Governance (CCG 2012 and its 
predecessor CCG 2005)152 issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) requires that “[e]very company should be headed by an effective 
Board to lead and control the company.”153 Instead, the CCG 2012 allows 
the board to “decide on what it considers an appropriate size for the Board, 
which facilitates effective decision making.”154 Of course, the board should 
not be “so large as to be unwieldy.”155 There is also no law requiring state 
representation in the companies controlled by Temasek, and Singapore does 
not require employee representation. These issues are matters for a 
company’s shareholders to put into the company’s constitution if deemed 
necessary. 
Most listed companies rely on a nomination committee for board 
nominations, as required by both CCG 2012 and CCG 2005. A company’s 
board should establish a nomination committee that makes 
recommendations on every board appointment.156 This committee should 
have at least three directors, and the majority of the committee should be 
 
 149 Id. at 130–132. 
 150 NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUS., THE STATE’S OWNERSHIP REPORT 2010 26 
(2010), http://www.statoil.com/en/about/corporategovernance/shareholder/pages/thenorwegianstateas 
shareholder.aspx.,  
 151 Companies Act 1967 (Act 42 of 1967) s 145(1) (Sing.). 
 152 Compliance with the Code of Corporate Governance is prescribed by the rules of the SGX, but is 
voluntary for unlisted companies. CCG 2012 took effect with respect to annual reports relating to 
financial years commencing Nov. 1, 2012. However, certain rules will not be fully implemented until 
mid-2016. See Code of Corporate Governance, MONETARY AUTH. OF SINGAPORE, 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/regulations-and-financial-stability/regulatory-and-supervisory-framework/ 
corporate-governance/corporate-governance-of-listed-companies/code-of-corporate-governance.aspx.  
 153 MONETARY AUTH. OF SINGAPORE, CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2012 2 (2012), 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/resource/fin_development/corporate_governance/CGCRevisedCodeofC
orporateGovernance3May2012.pdf [hereinafter CCG 2012]. 
 154 Id. § 2.5. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. § 4.1. 
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independent directors.157 It should not only make recommendations on 
specific director appointments, but should also review the succession plan 
(notably for the chairman and CEO), board performance evaluation process, 
and director training programs.158 
Based on current laws, we can analyze the sizes of the boards of directors of 
the top fifty companies by market capitalization in the SGX (see Table 2 for 
a complete company list), with the results presented in Table 5A.  
  
 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. § 4.2. 
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TABLE 5A: NUMBER OF DIRECTORS ON THE BOARDS OF THE TOP 50 
COMPANIES ON THE SGX 
 
Item Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Hi Lo 
All 50 companies 50 10.52 11 2.88 20 4 
Companies in which 
Temasek has no 
substantial stake 
33 10.64 11 3.47 20 4 
Companies in which 
Temasek has a greater 
than 5% stake 
17 10.29 10 1.10 13 9 
Companies in which 
Temasek directly owns 
shares 
7 10.14 10 0.90 11 9 
Companies in which 
Temasek holds the 
majority of shares 
3 10.67 11 0.58 11 10 
All 30 STI component 
stocks 
30 10.9 11 2.73 20 5 
Listed companies in 
Temasek’s domestic 
portfolio (see Table 3) 
33 9. 9 1.80 13 6 
 
Table 5A shows that the companies in which Temasek has a stake or 
owns shares do not necessarily have larger boards than other larger listed 
companies. This sets a comparable benchmark when we compare the 
number of proportion of independent directors below. The results of a two-
sample t-test also provide no statistically significant evidence to suggest 
that the boards of these companies are larger than (p = 0.65), equal to (p = 
0.69), or smaller than (p = 0.35) those of other large companies listed on the 
SGX. 
We also examined the size of company boards between 2010 and 2013 
based on the list of fifty companies in Table 2. To determine Temasek’s 
stake in each, we used data from these companies’ annual reports for each 
corresponding year. The results are presented in Table 5B. 
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TABLE 5B: AVERAGE SIZE OF BOARDS BETWEEN 2010 AND 2013 
 
Category Mean (median, 
obs.159) 
2013 
 
2012 2011 2010 
All 50 companies 10.52 
(11, 50) 
10.62 
(10, 50) 
10.60 
(10.5, 48) 
10.53 
(11, 47) 
Companies in which Temasek 
has no substantial stake 
10.64 
(11, 33) 
10.73 
(10, 33) 
10.68 
(10.5, 32) 
10.48 
(11, 31) 
Companies in which Temasek 
has a greater than 5% stake 
10.29 
(10, 17) 
10.41 
(10, 17) 
10.44 
(10.5, 16) 
10.63 
(10.5, 16) 
Companies in which Temasek 
directly owns shares 
10.14 
(10, 7) 
10.43 
(10, 7) 
10.43 
(11, 7) 
11 
(12, 7) 
Companies in which Temasek 
holds the majority of shares 
10.67 
(11, 3) 
10.33 
(10, 3) 
10.67 
(11, 3) 
11 
(12, 3) 
 
Table 5B shows that the average size of the board in each category 
varied little between 2010 and 2013. Thus, at least since 2010, there has 
been little difference in the average board size of the fifty companies 
surveyed between those in which Temasek has a stake and those in which it 
does not. The board size of the top fifty companies on the SGX is also quite 
similar to the average figures reported for S&P 500 firms in the U.S. over 
the past decade. A study has shown that the average board size for S&P 500 
firms was 10.7 between 2010 and 2013, comparable to the figures shown in 
Table 5B.160 
In fact, the companies in which Temasek holds a stake actually have 
slightly smaller boards on average than the other top listed companies in 
Singapore. What is also interesting is that there is little variation in the size 
of the boards of the companies in which Temasek has a stake (i.e., around 
ten directors) relative to other companies. It is possible that Temasek 
prefers boards of a certain size despite the absence of any law in Singapore 
prescribing the board size of companies linked to Temasek or the 
government. 
In addition to board size, another yardstick of corporate governance is 
the amount of state representation on the board. In general, in the pool of 
domestic and foreign companies we surveyed, we found no Temasek-
nominated directors on their boards. One explanation may be Temasek’s 
desire not to “become privy to price-sensitive information that might limit 
 
 159 Some of the companies in our list of top fifty companies were not listed in 2010 or 2011, leading 
to a different number of observations in different years. 
 160 Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board Independence, 92 N.C. L. REV. 855, 864–65 
(2014). 
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its ability to trade shares.”161 Of the GLCs in which Temasek directly holds 
shares, the government has the strongest presence in Singapore 
Technologies Engineering, which has three directors with direct 
connections to the government. As this company manufactures defense 
products, it is understandable that the government would have a strong 
interest in its management.162 Even so, of the seven other directors on the 
company’s eleven member strong board in 2013, none was a nominee of 
Temasek or the government. The evidence seems to put Singapore’s 
Temasek model closer to Scandinavian countries such as Norway or 
Denmark, which adopt the centralized model of SOEs but without state 
representation.163 It also accords with the general perception that Temasek 
does not directly intervene in the management of the companies in which it 
has a stake, although it is unavoidable that some directors may have worked 
for Temasek before serving on those companies’ boards.164  
We do not wish to imply that Temasek is not at all concerned with 
board composition. It has been reported that Temasek has pressed Standard 
Chartered, a large British bank, to formulate a clear succession plan for its 
top management.165 Although it is not clear in Temasek’s domestic 
portfolio, the company does sometimes insert a representative on a 
company board. One example is FTS International, Inc., an unlisted U.S. 
company. Of the eight directors named on the company’s website, three 
clearly had Temasek connections.166 In another example, when Temasek 
formed a joint venture with E.SUN Financial Holdings in Taiwan, it 
acquired one seat on the board of E.SUN.167 These examples indicate that 
Temasek may adopt a more hands-on approach when the firm in question is 
an unlisted foreign firm. Such a position would be understandable, as 
Temasek’s power to control the management of a foreign company is more 
limited than in the case of a domestic firm. 
In sum, in this section, we show that the companies in which Temasek 
has a stake have boards no larger than those of other top listed companies in 
Singapore. In addition, with few exceptions (notably foreign investments), 
 
 161 Supra note 8. 
 162 See Overview, ST ENGINEERING, http://www.stengg.com/about-us/overview (last visited Jan. 3, 
2016). 
 163 See supra note 147. 
 164 For example, Mr. Hsieh Fu Hua (the former president of Temasek) is currently a director of 
UOB, the third largest banking group in Singapore. Mr. Chan Heng Wing (a director of Fraser & Neave 
in 2013) and Ms. Lim Hwee Hua (a director of Jardine Cycle & Carriage) both worked for Temasek 
earlier in their careers.  
 165 Patrick Jenkins & Martin Arnold, StanChart Urged to Start Work on Sands Succession Plan, FIN. 
TIMES (July 29, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fcfec3a2-1287-11e4-93a5-00144feabdc0.html# 
axzz38RdEY8HK. 
 166 See Board of Directors, FTS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.ftsi.com/about/Pages/board-of-
directors.aspx. 
 167 See infra note 237. 
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Temasek does not nominate or control the directors of the boards of 
companies in which it has a stake. These results contradict OECD’s 
criticism that “in a number of OECD countries SOE boards still tend to be 
too large, excessively staggered with too many state representatives lacking 
business perspective, and often independence.”168 
 C. Number of Independent Directors 
An important element of corporate governance is the ability and 
capacity of the board to make independent decisions. The OECD has 
observed that “[a] key factor in ensuring that boards can function efficiently 
and effectively is their independence. Boards must have autonomy and 
independence in the conduct of their duties and be free from day-to-day 
involvement from Ministers.”169 The degree of independence that SOE 
boards enjoy is partially dependent on the size and characteristics of the 
board and the number of state and employee representatives on the board.170 
The number of independent directors on the board is another yardstick for 
evaluating the quality of a company’s corporate governance. We recognize 
that it is arguable whether the presence of more independent directors 
necessarily increases shareholder value, although there is a general trend 
“toward increasingly independent boards and the growing academic 
consensus that supermajority independent boards do result in greater 
corporate profitability.”171 Whether independent directors actually serve 
their intended function is not something that can be analyzed from public 
records. However, having more independent directors on a board should in 
theory increase the likelihood of that board making independent decisions, 
and thus decrease agency costs and the likelihood of mismanagement.172  
Singapore’s Companies Act has no requirements concerning 
independent directors. However, an SGX-listed company must comply with 
the Code of Corporate Governance’s requirement to include a certain 
number of independent directors on its board. Independent directors are 
voluntary for unlisted firms. According to CCG 2012, “[t]here should be a 
strong and independent element on the Board, with independent directors 
 
 168 OECD 2005 REPORT, supra note 11, at 122. 
 169 Id. at 127 (quoting Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Parliament of Australia, 
Corporate Governance and Accountability Arrangements for Commonwealth Government Business 
Enterprises: Report 372 (1999) 53).  
 170 Id. at 127–28. 
 171 Velikonja, supra note 160, at 864. See generally Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain 
Relationship between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999) (considers 
the empirical evidence regarding whether board independence affects firm performance). 
 172 For a general discussion of independent directors and corporate governance, see Donald C. 
Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 150–53 
(2006). 
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making up at least one-third of the Board.”173 However, the threshold is 
raised to 50% if the chairman and CEO have certain connections (i.e., they 
are the same person or are immediate family members) or when the 
chairman is also part of the management team or is not an independent 
director.174 This stipulation differs from CCG 2005, which prescribed the 
minimum one-third threshold without outlining any exceptions.175 However, 
as the new requirement will not take full effect until 2016, we are not yet in 
a position to properly assess compliance with it.176 
In Singapore, an independent director is defined as a director “who has 
no relationship with the company, its related corporations, its 10% 
shareholders or its officers that could interfere, or be reasonably perceived 
to interfere, with the exercise of the director’s independent business 
judgment with a view to the best interests of the company.”177 Further, 
“[d]irectors should disclose to the Board any such relationship as and when 
it arises.”178 The independence of a director is determined by nomination 
committee members, the majority of whom should be independent directors 
and who consider factors relevant to a director’s relationship with the 
company or related companies.179 However, even when a specified 
relationship exists, the nomination committee can still consider the director 
in question to be independent. The reasons for this determination must be 
disclosed and explained in the company’s annual report.180 
We further examined the number of independent directors on the 
boards of the top fifty companies on the SGX (see Table 2). Unfortunately, 
the annual reports of four of these firms had insufficient information for us 
to ascertain that number.181 We considered a director to be independent or 
non-executive if the company’s annual report designates him or her as such. 
We did not otherwise re-examine a director’s independence in lieu of a 
nomination committee’s decision. For this research, we assume the 
information in these company reports to be accurate and truthful. With 
these caveats, the number of independent directors in the top fifty 
companies on the SGX is provided in Table 6A. 
  
 
 173 CCG 2012, supra note 153, § 2.1. 
 174 Id. § 2.2. 
 175 CCG 2005, supra note 153, § 2.1. 
 176 Supra note 152. 
 177 CCG 2012, supra note 153, § 2.3. Compared with the 2005 version, CCG 2012 adds that a 
connection with a substantial shareholder may also factor into a director’s influence. 
 178 Id. 
 179 CCG 2012, supra note 153, § 2.3. 
 180 CCG 2012, supra note 153, §§ 2.3, 4.3. 
 181 All four companies belong to the same Jardine group. They are Hong Kong Land Holdings Ltd., 
Jardine Matheson Holdings Ltd., Jardine Strategic Holdings Ltd., and Dairy Farm Ltd. Despite being 
listed in Singapore, they are incorporated in Bermuda and dual-listed in Bermuda and London. 
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TABLE 6A: NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ON TOP 50 COMPANIES’ 
BOARDS 
 
Category (as in 2013 
annual report) 
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Hi Lo 
All 50 companies 46 5.74 6 1.99 10 2 
Companies in which 
Temasek has no 
substantial stake 
29 5.21 5 2.09 10 2 
Companies in which 
Temasek has a greater 
than 5% stake 
17 6.65 7 1.46 10 4 
Companies in which 
Temasek directly owns 
shares 
7 7.71 7 1.11 10 7 
Companies in which 
Temasek holds the 
majority of shares 
3 7.67 8 0.58 8 7 
All 30 STI component 
stocks 
27 6.63 7 1.69 10 3 
Listed companies in 
Temasek’s domestic 
portfolio (see Table 3) 
33 6.09 6 1.84 10 3 
 
 
Table 6A shows that the average number of independent directors is 
slightly higher on the boards of the companies in which Temasek has a 
stake. The results of a two-sample t-test confirm that such companies are 
more likely than others to have more independent directors on their boards 
(p = 0.02). The difference becomes more obvious when Temasek directly 
owns shares in a company. However, we should caution that the average 
figures for the listed companies in Temasek’s domestic portfolio in Table 3 
are not markedly higher, and thus we do not wish to exaggerate our 
findings. 
Our data also allowed us to go back in time to trace Temasek’s 
influence on the same list of companies over the past few years. For 
simplicity, we show only the mean and median of the number of 
independent directors in each category. The results are presented in Table 
6B. 
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TABLE 6B: AVERAGE NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS BETWEEN 
2010 AND 2013 
 
Category (as in 2013 
annual report) 
Mean (median, obs.) 
2013 
 
2012 2011 2010 
All 50 companies 5.74 
(6, 46) 
5.74 
(6, 46) 
6 
(6, 44) 
5.72 
(5, 43) 
Companies in which Temasek 
has no substantial stake 
5.21 
(5, 29) 
5.41 
(6, 29) 
5.64 
(5, 28) 
5.37 
(5, 27) 
Companies in which Temasek 
has a greater than 5% stake 
6.65 
(7, 17) 
6.29 
(7, 17) 
6.63 
(6, 16) 
6.31 
(6.5, 16) 
Companies in which Temasek 
directly owns shares 
7.71 
(7, 7) 
7.43 
(7, 7) 
7.57 
(7, 7) 
8 
(8, 7) 
Companies in which Temasek 
holds the majority of shares 
7.67 
(8, 3) 
7 
(7, 3) 
7.33 
(7, 3) 
7.67 
(7, 3) 
Association between Temasek 
holding a substantial stake and 
having more independent 
directors than the other 
companies in Table 2 
 
p = 0.01 
 
p = 0.07 
 
p = 0.07 
 
p = 0.09 
Association between Temasek 
directly owning shares and 
having more independent 
directors than the other 
companies in Table 2 
 
p = 0.001 
 
p = 0.004 
 
p = 0.015 
 
p = 0.007 
 
Table 6B shows that the figures in each category vary little between 
2010 and 2013. At least in recent years, the companies in which Temasek 
holds a stake seem to have more independent directors on their boards than 
other top listed firms. However, if we perform a two-sample t-test on each 
year, only in 2013 do we find a statistically significant relationship between 
a Temasek stake and a company having more independent directors than 
other top companies. Whether the result could be replicated in 2014 or 
beyond remains to be seen. If we narrow our analysis to companies in 
which Temasek directly owns shares, we find a statistically significant such 
relationship for all four years. Thus, the results presented in Table 6B show 
that Temasek does seem to exert a positive effect in terms of the number of 
independent directors associated firms have on their boards.  
In sum, our data show that companies in which Temasek has a stake 
have more independent or non-executive directors on their boards than 
other large companies listed in Singapore. Although it may be unfair to 
assess the influence of independent directors based purely on their numbers, 
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the existence of more independent directors on the board is generally taken 
as a sign of good corporate governance. It could be that these boards have 
fewer executive directors to ensure board independence. To ascertain the 
truth of this supposition, we also examine the proportion of independent on 
the boards of Singapore firms in the next section. 
 D. Proportion of Independent Board Directors  
Table 7A shows the proportion of independent directors on the boards 
of directors of the top fifty companies listed on the SGX (see Table 2). 
 
TABLE 7A: PROPORTION (%) OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
 
Category (as in 2013 
annual report) 
Obs. Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
Hi Lo 
All 50 companies 46 57% 57% 16.55 91% 33% 
Companies in which 
Temasek has no 
substantial stake 
29 52% 50% 16.69 91% 33% 
Companies in which 
Temasek has a greater 
than 5% stake 
17 65% 64% 13.57 91% 38% 
Companies in which 
Temasek directly 
owns shares 
7 76% 78% 8.60 91% 64% 
Companies in which 
Temasek holds the 
majority of shares 
3 72% 73% 8.20 80% 64% 
All 30 STI component 
stocks 
27 64% 64% 14.92 91% 38% 
Listed companies in 
Temasek’s domestic 
portfolio (see Table 3) 
33 65% 67% 14.54 91% 38% 
 
Similar to the results for the number of independent directors shown in 
Table 6A, Table 7A also shows that companies in which Temasek holds a 
stake seem to have a higher proportion of independent directors on their 
boards. The proportion is even higher in companies in which Temasek 
directly owns shares. Further analysis reveals a statistically significant 
relationship between a Temasek stake and a company having a higher 
proportion of independent directors than other companies (p = 0.01), a sign 
that Temasek exercises a positive influence over the composition of 
company boards. Again, we should caution that the average figures for the 
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listed companies in Temasek’s domestic portfolio in Table 3 are not 
markedly higher, and thus we do not wish to exaggerate our findings. 
It is worth noting that none of the companies we surveyed had a 
proportion of independent directors below that required by CCG 2005 (i.e., 
one-third). As CCG 2012 has not yet taken full effect, we cannot comment 
on how these firms have adapted to the new code and its more stringent 
standards for independent directors. However, Table 7A shows that, on 
average, more than half the directors on the boards of the top fifty 
companies on the SGX are independent directors. If we consider companies 
in which Temasek is a shareholder, the figure rises to 70%. Although the 
figures in Table 7A are lower than the average figures for S&P 500 firms 
between 1997 and 2013,182 they constitute encouraging news for the 
Singapore market.  
In any case, we should not become overly obsessed with the figures in 
Tables 7A. For example, CapitaLand has a higher proportion of 
independent directors than First Resources (ten out of eleven [90.91%] 
versus five out of six [83.33%]),183 but in both companies only one director 
is non-independent. It is thus also of value to examine the number of non-
independent directors (who can be either executive or non-executive 
directors) on company boards (see Table 7B). 
  
 
 182 Velikonja, supra note 160, at 864–65.  
 183 CAPITALAND LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2014 (2014), http://capitaland.listedcompany.com/ 
misc/ar2014.pdf. FIRST RESOURCES LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2014 (2014), http://www.first-
resources.com/upload/file/20150511/20150511044538_35274.pdf. 
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TABLE 7B: NUMBER OF NON-INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ON BOARDS 
 
Category (as in 2013 
annual report) 
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Hi Lo 
All 50 companies 46 4.43 4 2.32 12 1 
Companies in which 
Temasek has no 
substantial stake 
29 4.90 5 2.57 12 1 
Companies in which 
Temasek has a greater 
than 5% stake 
17 3.65 4 1.62 8 1 
Companies in which 
Temasek directly owns 
shares 
7 2.43 2 0.98 4 1 
Companies in which 
Temasek holds the 
majority of shares 
3 3 3 1 4 2 
All 30 STI component 
stocks 
27 3.92 3 2.42 12 1 
Listed companies in 
Temasek’s domestic 
portfolio in which it has 
a stake (see the list in 
Table 3) 
33 3.30 3 1.63 8 1 
 
 
It can be seen from Table 7B that the companies in which Temasek 
holds a stake have fewer non-independent directors than other top 
companies. Indeed, we found a statistically significant relationship between 
a Temasek stake and a company having fewer non-independent directors 
that other large companies (p = 0.04), a finding that is consistent with the 
foregoing discussion.  
We can again go back in time to trace Temasek’s influence on the top 
companies listed in Table 2 over the past few years. The results are 
presented in Table 7C. 
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TABLE 7C: AVERAGE PROPORTION (%) OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
BETWEEN 2010 AND 2013 
 
Category (as in 2013 
annual report) 
Mean (median, obs.) 
2013 
 
2012 2011 2010 
All 50 companies 57% 
(57%, 46) 
57% 
(55%, 46) 
59% 
59%, 44) 
56% 
(56%, 43) 
Companies in which 
Temasek has no 
substantial stake 
58% 
(50%, 29) 
54% 
(61%, 29) 
56% 
(57%, 28) 
56% 
(55%, 27) 
Companies in which 
Temasek has a greater 
than 5% stake 
65% 
(64%, 17) 
61% 
(58%, 17) 
63% 
(63%, 16) 
59% 
(61%, 16) 
Companies in which 
Temasek directly owns 
shares 
76% 
(78%, 7) 
72% 
(75%, 7) 
73% 
(75%, 7) 
73% 
(78%, 7) 
Companies in which 
Temasek holds the 
majority of shares 
72% 
(73%, 3) 
69% 
(70%, 3) 
69% 
(75%, 3) 
70% 
(78%, 3) 
Association between 
Temasek having a 
substantial stake and a 
company having more 
independent directors 
than the other 
companies in Table 2 
 
p = 0.01 
 
p = 0.08 
 
p = 0.08 
 
p = 0.22 
Association between 
Temasek directly 
owning shares and a 
company having more 
independent directors 
than the other 
companies in Table 2 
 
p < 0.001 
 
p = 0.003 
 
p = 0.007 
 
p = 0.003 
 
The figures in each category of Table 7C vary little from 2010 to 2013, 
and we can thus assume that our findings fit into a general pattern over the 
past few years. Again, if we perform a two-sample t-test on each year, only 
in 2013 do we find a statistically significant relationship between a 
Temasek stake and a company having more independent directors than 
other top companies. However, if we narrow our analysis to companies in 
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which Temasek directly owns shares (i.e., Temasek could directly exercise 
voting power in those companies’ general meeting to elect directors), we 
see a statistically significant such relationship for all four years.  
Our data show that the companies in which Temasek has a stake tend 
to be close to “supermajority independent boards,”184 which coincides with 
studies of the independence of S&P 500 firm boards between 1997 and 
2013.185 However, it remains open to debate whether a supermajority 
independent board is a good thing or a bad thing. On its face, having a 
supermajority of independent directors should be better than simply having 
a majority independent board as academics generally agree that having a 
majority independent boards is a good thing.186 However, “the marginal 
cost of the diminishing quality of information exceeds the marginal benefit 
of increased independence” when the board reaches the majority mark.187 A 
super-majority board might be only marginally more willing than majority 
independent boards to fire a chief executive;188 some commentators also 
reported that supermajority boards performed no better than merely 
majority independent boards.189 Although we take no position on the matter 
in this Article, our data suggest that Temasek is pushing its portfolio of 
GLCs to have more independent directors on their boards to the point of 
sometimes having supermajority independent boards. Such prompting 
seems indicative of an intention to pursue good corporate governance. 
Whether this phenomenon would make Temasek’s portfolio of GLCs more 
profitable will require another study. 
Can the same phenomenon be seen among the unlisted companies 
controlled by Temasek? Although we do not have complete data, it seems 
that some of the private companies that are majority or fully owned by 
Temasek have chosen to comply with the Code of Corporate Governance 
even though they are not required to do so. For example, Mapletree 
Investments Pte. Ltd., which is fully owned by Temasek and manages a 
variety of listed real estate investment trusts, has six independent directors 
on its seven-strong board. For Singapore Technologies Telemedia Pte. Ltd., 
also fully owned by Temasek, the figure is six out of eight. This evidence 
indicates that Temasek may be applying the same policy to its entire range 
of domestic investments, regardless of whether they are public or private 
companies. 
In sum, our data indicate that Temasek seems to be exerting a positive 
effect on corporate governance as measured by the number and proportion 
 
 184 Velikonja, supra note 160, at 864. 
 185 Id. at 865. 
 186 Id. at 867. 
 187 Id. at 868. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 868–69. 
36_2_2_CHEN FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 3/30/16  3:21 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 36:303 (2016) 
348 
of independent directors on its associated companies’ boards, although we 
have no record of Temasek’s actual influence during general meetings or 
through any informal means. Its record in this regard places Temasek in the 
company of the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, 
Australia, and New Zealand, where the boards of most SOEs comprise 
independent directors.190  
 E. Role of Chairman and CEO  
In addition to board composition, a company’s corporate governance 
can also be assessed by the roles and/or relationship of its chairman and 
CEO or managing director. If the chairman and CEO are the same person or 
have a close relationship, the chairman may lack sufficient independence to 
make good judgments objectively in supervising management, though in 
practice many successfully companies do not separate the roles of chairman 
and CEO.  
Singapore law provides little guidance on the function, power, and 
responsibilities of chairman and CEOs, which are as a result left primarily 
to a company’s constitution to determine. For listed companies, CCG 2012 
states that “[t]here should be a clear division of responsibilities between the 
leadership of the Board and the executives responsible for managing the 
company’s business. No one individual should represent a considerable 
concentration of power.”191 The Code also requires that the chairman and 
CEO be separate persons in principle to increase accountability and the 
board’s capacity to make independent judgments.192 If they share a close 
family relationship, that fact should be disclosed.193 Moreover, the role of 
the chairman is to lead the board and ensure that it functions effectively, 
and to facilitate the contributions of board members.194 The Code also 
requires that a company appoint an independent director to take the lead in 
certain situations, such as when the chairman and CEO are the same person 
or immediate family members, when the chairman is part of the 
management team, or when the chairman is not an independent director.195 
Drawing on this discussion of the current legal structure, we compare 
the chairman and CEO roles in the top fifty companies on the SGX based 
on their 2013 annual reports. We first examine the nature of the chairman, 
with the results presented in Table 8A. 
  
 
 190 OECD 2005 REPORT, supra note 11, at 128. 
 191 CCG 2012, supra note 153, princ. 3. 
 192 Id. § 3.1. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. § 3.2. 
 195 Id. § 3.3. 
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TABLE 8A: NATURE OF CHAIRMAN 
 
Category (as in 
annual report of 
2013) 
Obs. Executive Non-
executive 
Independent 
director 
Chairman 
also CEO 
All 50 companies 48 15 16 17 4 (out of a 
pool of 50 
companies) 
Companies in 
which Temasek 
has no substantial 
stake 
31 15 7 9 4 
Companies in 
which Temasek 
has a greater than 
5% stake 
17 0 9 8 0 
Companies in 
which Temasek 
directly owns 
shares 
7 0 2 5 0 
Companies in 
which Temasek 
holds the majority 
of shares 
3 0 2 1 0 
All 30 STI 
component stocks 
30 9 8 13 2 
Listed companies 
in Temasek’s 
domestic portfolio 
(see Table 3) 
33 0 13 20 0 
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Table 8A shows that in none of the companies in which Temasek 
holds a stake is the chairman an executive director, and certainly none of 
the chairmen is also the CEO of their company. Even for the companies in 
Table 2, however, less than 10% have a chairman and CEO who is the same 
individual. Thus, it seems to be common practice among the top companies 
on the SGX to split the role of chairman and CEO. In fact, the record of 
these companies is better than that of S&P 500 companies in 2013 when 
45% of S&P 500 companies are found to separate the roles of CEO and 
chairman.196 If we divide the role of chairman into two groups—executive 
and non-executive (including independent directors)—we find a statistically 
significant relationship between a Temasek stake and a company being 
more likely to have a chairman who is a non-executive director than other 
companies (Fisher’s exact = 0.00).  
Another way to assess the role of CEO is to examine the CEO 
nomination process. In 2005, the OECD observed that companies in most 
OECD countries choose their CEOs through a political process rather than 
through the route of company law.197 The OECD has not produced 
conclusive evidence on how far and how deep the political process affects 
the nomination of management, though it still recognized that 
“[p]oliticisation of the appointment process . . . in some jurisdictions, 
remains an impediment to consistent and transparent process.”198 There is 
no evidence to show that the companies in which Temasek has a stake have 
a different nomination process from that of other top listed companies. With 
the exception of listed real estate investment trusts,199 listed companies are 
required by the Code of Corporate Governance to have nomination 
committees.200  
Our survey of the directors of the top fifty listed companies on the 
SGX turned up no evidence of Temasek directly appointing nominee 
directors to a company board, although some directors have previously 
worked with Temasek or with GLCs in which it has a stake. This is 
unavoidable given that Singapore is a small city-state. However, as 
Temasek often invests in companies via a subsidiary, it is sometimes 
difficult to ascertain a company’s link with Temasek. If we count only those 
directors with a direct connection to Temasek (e.g., working as an executive 
of or serving on the board of directors or advisory board of Temasek), there 
are only nine (out of 176) on the boards of the seventeen companies in 
which Temasek has a stake, among them Mr. Simon Israel (former 
 
 196 Velikonja, supra note 160, at 864–65. 
 197 OECD 2005 REPORT, supra note 11, at 140. 
 198 OECD 2013 REPORT, supra note 143, at 30. 
 199 Real estate investment trusts are not required to have nomination or remuneration committees. 
Their management companies alone are required to have these committees. 
 200 CCG 2012, supra note 153, § 4.1. 
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executive director of Temasek, who sits on the boards of SingTel and 
CapitaLand) and Mr. Peter Seah (a member of the Temasek Advisory 
Board, who sits on the Starhub and DBS Group boards). This is opposed to 
six directors out of a total of 353 directors for the top fifty companies in the 
SGX. Although this research is preliminary and caution needs to be 
exercised in interpreting its results, we can at least state that there is no 
clear proof that companies in which Temasek holds a stake prefer to elect 
directors with a past connection to Temasek. 
 F. Preferential Government Treatment? 
As previously discussed, one potential problem with SOEs is that the 
state might use them to meet certain policy or political ends or ask them to 
give preferential treatment to the state itself, other SOEs, or individuals 
with government connections at the company’s expense. It is a pitfall in 
countries in which personal relationships are an important part of doing 
business.201 For example, it might be interesting to know whether the 
government would award a project to a SOE due to its connection with the 
state or whether a regulator would apply less penalties to a SOE for a 
breach of law. A higher degree of preference treatment to SOEs is also a 
sign of the state’s interference in the market and the confusion of roles of 
being both regulators and shareholders. This issue offers us another angle 
by which to analyze Temasek and its portfolio of GLCs.  
Although we lack complete data, there are signs that the Singapore 
government has not let its role as the ultimate stakeholder interfere with its 
regulatory function. For example, the government fined SingTel (as noted 
the largest telecoms group in Singapore and majority-owned by Temasek) a 
record SGD 6 million (about USD 4.8 million) in April 2014 for a fire in 
the Bukit Pajang Internet Exchange that caused service disruption in parts 
of Singapore.202 This fine was preceded by a series of fines imposed by the 
Media Development Authority for disruption to SingTel’s cable TV 
services in 2012 and 2013.203 Other telecoms firms in Singapore have not 
been punished in this way, judging by the regulator’s press releases.  
 
 201 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 4, at 706. 
 202 Irene Tham, SingTel Fined a Record $6m for Bukit Panjang Exchange Fire; OpenNet and 
CityNet also Fined, STRAITS TIMES (May 6, 2014), http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singtel-fined-
a-record-6m-for-bukit-panjang-exchange-fire-opennet-and-citynet-also-fined. 
 203 SingTel has been fined on several occasions: in December and February of 2013 and September 
of 2012. See Press Release, Media Dev. Auth. Singapore, MDA Fines SingNet S$220,000 for Mio TV 
Service Disruption in May (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.mda.gov.sg/AboutMDA 
/NewsReleasesSpeechesAndAnnouncements/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?news=604; Press Release, Media 
Dev. Auth. Singapore, MDA Fines SingNet S$80,000 for Mio TV Service Disruptions (Sept. 21, 2012), 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/AboutMDA/NewsReleasesSpeechesAndAnnouncements/Pages/NewsDetail.asp
x?news=17.  
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Although concerns have been expressed over the sale of OpenNet (the 
manufacturer and owner of Singapore’s optical cable network) to 
SingTel,204 there is no apparent wrongdoing, as SingTel was already a 
shareholder of OpenNet. Moreover, the media regulator has forced SingTel 
to share with Starhub (a fierce competitor in the cable TV services market) 
the broadcasting of Barclays English Premier League football since 
acquiring exclusive broadcasting rights in 2010.205 All of these examples 
provide evidence that Singapore’s regulators do not treat SingTel 
differently from other firms, although we should mention that Temasek also 
holds stakes in two other telecoms firms in Singapore.206 
Turning to the financial sector, there is similarly no proof that the 
government interferes in the management of DBS, the city-state’s largest 
financial group in which Temasek holds about a 30% stake, or forces it to 
extend credit to local businesses or other GLCs. In fact, none of the three 
local banking groups received—or required—a government bail-out during 
the 2008 global financial crisis, and all score well in global rankings of the 
safest or strongest banks.207 Thus, there appears to be no question of the 
Singapore government forcing government-linked banks to pursue some 
policy or political objective. Furthermore, MAS fined DBS for the 
disruption of its online banking and ATM services in 2010, and the 
financial regulator also required the bank to provide additional capital to 
deal with operational risks.208 These are signs that the regulator does not 
give preferential treatment to the bank because it is partially owned by 
Temasek.  
DBS also duly reported its exposure to related-party transactions, 
including transactions with a list of companies in which Temasek has a 
stake (e.g., Singapore Airlines, SingTel, CapitaLand, Mapletree 
 
 204 Wong Wei Han & David Bottomley, OpenNet Set for Sale in Proposed S$126m Deal, TODAY 
(July 24, 2014), http://www.todayonline.com/business/opennet-set-sale-proposed-s126m-deal. 
 205 Press Release, Media Dev. Auth. Singapore, MDA Directs SingNet to Cross-Carry Barclays 
Premier League 2013–2016 Seasons (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.mda.gov.sg/AboutMDA/ 
NewsReleasesSpeechesAndAnnouncements/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?news=5. 
 206 See Table 1 of this Article. 
 207 For example, in the annual ranking of the world’s safest fifty banks by Global Finance Magazine, 
the three Singaporean banking groups were ranked twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth in 2013. The three 
were also the top three Asian banks on the list. See World’s Safest 50 Banks 2013, GLOBAL FIN. 
MAGAZINE (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.gfmag.com/awards-rankings/best-banks-and-financial-
rankings/worlds-50-safest-banks-2013. In Bloomberg’s annual ranking of the world’s strongest twenty 
banks, the three Singaporean banking groups all made the cut (including OCBC at No. 4 and DBS at No. 
7) in 2014. See The World’s Strongest Banks, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-15/hang-seng-bank-tops-list-of-strongest-lenders.html. 
 208 MAS Lifts the Operational Risk Multiplier Imposed DBS Bank Ltd, MONETARY AUTH. OF 
SINGAPORE (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/2011/ 
MAS-Lifts-the-Operational-Risk-Multiplier-Imposed-on-DBS-Bank-Ltd.aspx.  
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Investments, SMRT, and Starhub) in its annual report.209 Although we do 
not have the means to examine the details of those transactions in relation to 
other deals in the market, there is no obvious wrongdoing associated with 
them.  
In sum, there is no evidence that Temasek and its GLCs are pressed by 
the government to meet political objectives or afford other GLCs 
preferential treatment. The public record also suggests that the government 
does not hesitate in imposing hefty fines on GLCs. It is beyond our remit to 
speculate about whether there are deals omitted from the publicly disclosed 
information. Given the lack of comprehensive information, it is also 
impossible to draw an empirical conclusion on the matter. However, from 
what we have seen thus far, it does seem that the Singapore government 
handles its role as regulator and ultimate stakeholder of GLCs reasonably 
well.  
 G. Comparison with Large Listed Companies in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan 
To put Temasek and Singapore’s corporate governance standards into 
context and determine how they perform in relation to those of their Asian 
competitors, we now compare the data presented earlier with data collected 
from the component stocks of the Hang Seng Index (HSI) listed on the 
Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx)210 and the Taiwan 50 Index component 
stocks traded on the Taiwan Stock Exchange211 as of July 1, 2014. Each 
index contains fifty companies to allow comparison with the list of the top 
fifty companies on the SGX.  
Before we present our data, it must be emphasized that this is not a 
complete survey of all listed companies in the three markets. The data 
presented in this section are purely for comparison purposes. Our data is 
intended only to illustrate certain aspects of the corporate governance 
practices of the fifty largest and/or signature companies in the three 
markets. Sample bias is thus a possibility. Due to space limitations, we do 
not venture further in considering SOE corporate governance rules and 
regulations outside Singapore. Nonetheless, the data presented in this 
section sheds useful light on how the companies in which Temasek holds a 
stake fare in comparison with other top companies (including SOEs) in East 
 
 209 DBS GROUP HOLDINGS LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2013 70 (2013), http://www.dbs.com/ 
annualreports/2013/index.html. 
 210 The latest component stocks of the HIS can be found in the index’s dedicated website. Major 
Indexes, HANGE SENG INDEXES COMPANY LTD., http://www.hsi.com.hk/HSI-Net/HSI-Net. 
 211 The latest information on the Taiwan 50 Index can be found on the website of Taiwan Stock 
Exchange. Táiwān 50 zhǐshù chéngfèn gǔpiào (臺灣50指數成分股票) [Taiwan 50 Index Component 
Stocks], TÁIWĀN ZHÈNGQUÀN JIĀOYÌ SUǑ (臺灣證券交易所) [TAIWAN STOCK EXCHANGE], 
http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/trading/indices/twco/tai50i.php. 
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Asia. 
Our first comparison concerns board size, with data taken from the 
companies’ 2013 annual reports. The results are presented in Table 9A. 
 
TABLE 9A: NUMBER OF DIRECTORS ON THE BOARDS OF TOP 50 
COMPANIES IN THE THREE MARKETS 
 
Item (as in 2013 
annual report) 
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Hi Lo 
Overall 
Singapore: 50 largest 
companies by market 
capitalization (see 
Table 2) 
50 10.52 11 2.88 20 4 
Hong Kong: HSI 
component stocks 
50 13.22 13 3.56 22 6 
Taiwan: Taiwan 50 
Index component 
stocks 
50 10.82 9.5 3.84 21 5 
SOEs 
Singapore: companies 
in which Temasek 
holds a greater than 5% 
stake (out of the 50 
companies in Table 2) 
17 10.29 10 1.10 13 9 
Hong Kong: Chinese 
SOEs in the HSI 
22 12.73 12.5 3.12 19 6 
Taiwan: companies in 
the Taiwan 50 Index in 
which the government 
owns 5% or more of 
the shares 
11 11.45 9 4.32 21 7 
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It is clear from Table 9A that the size of the boards in the top fifty 
companies of Singapore and Taiwan is similar, whereas the boards of the 
Hong Kong-listed companies are slightly larger. Of the companies in which 
the government has a greater than 5% stake, the average board size in the 
Singapore and Taiwanese lists is quite similar, although there is less 
variation among the firms in which Temasek holds a stake relative to those 
in which the Taiwanese government holds a stake. In the Hong Kong list, 
we find only one company that is owned by the Hong Kong government,212 
but the HSI contains a number of Chinese SOEs. Accordingly, we use 
Chinese SOEs as our benchmark and note that, similar to the general 
pattern, Hong Kong-listed Chinese SOEs have slightly larger boards than 
their Singaporean and Taiwanese counterparts. 
Our next comparison is the number of independent directors on the 
boards of the three sets of companies. The results are presented in Table 9B. 
  
 
 212 The company is the MTR Corp., the operator of Hong Kong’s subway system. 
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TABLE 9B: NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN TOP 50 COMPANIES 
IN THE THREE MARKETS 
 
Item (as in 2013 
annual report) 
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Hi Lo 
Overall 
Singapore: 50 largest 
companies by market 
capitalization (see 
Table 2) 
46 5.74 6 1.99 10 2 
Hong Kong: HSI 
component stocks 
50 5.64 5 2.12 13 3 
Taiwan: Taiwan 50 
Index component 
stocks 
50 2.46 3 1.34 5 0 
SOEs 
Singapore: companies 
in which Temasek 
holds a greater than 5% 
stake (out of the 
companies in Table 2) 
17 6.65 7 1.46 10 4 
Hong Kong: Chinese 
SOEs in the HSI 
22 4.86 5 2.12 7 3 
Taiwan: companies in 
the Taiwan 50 Index in 
which the government 
owns 5% or more of 
the shares 
11 2.45 3 1.86 5 0 
 
Table 9B shows that the sample companies in Singapore and Hong 
Kong have, on average, a higher number of independent directors than their 
counterparts in Taiwan. This observation may not do justice to Taiwan, 
however, as the country does not currently mandate that companies have 
independent directors,213 with the financial regulator only recently signaling 
its intention to force all listed firms to have independent directors by 
2017.214 If we focus our attention on SOEs, we see greater divergence in the 
 
 213 Zhèngquàn Jiāoyì Fǎ (證券交易法) [Securities and Exchange Act] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 30, 1968, effective Apr. 30, 1968), art. 14-2 (Taiwan). 
 214 See Press Release, Securities and Futures Bureau, Financial Supervisory Commission, Yùgào 
kuòdà dúlì dǒngshì jí shěnjì wěiyuánhuì zhī shèzhì fànwéi (預告擴大獨立董事及審計委員會之設置範
圍) [Trailer Set to Expand the Scope of the Independent Directors and Audit Committee] (Nov. 27, 
2013), http://www.sfb.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=95& 
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three markets. For example, the companies in which Temasek has a stake 
clearly have more independent directors on their boards than either the large 
Chinese SOEs in the HSI or Taiwanese SOEs in the Taiwan 50 Index.  
As noted previously, it is also useful to look at the proportion, rather 
than number, of independent directors. Accordingly, Table 9C lists the 
proportions of these directors on the boards of the companies in the three 
markets of interest.  
  
 
parentpath=0,2&mcustomize=news_view.jsp&dataserno=201311260002&aplistdn=ou=news,ou=multis
ite,ou=chinese,ou=ap_root,o=fsc,c=tw&toolsflag=Y. 
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TABLE 9C: PROPORTION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN TOP 50 
COMPANIES IN THE THREE MARKETS 
 
Item (as in 2013 
annual report) 
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Hi Lo 
Overall 
Singapore: 50 largest 
companies by market 
capitalization (see 
Table 2) 
46 57% 57% 16.55 91% 33% 
Hong Kong: HSI 
component stocks 
50 43% 38% 13.41 93% 24% 
Taiwan: Taiwan 50 
Index component 
stocks 
50 24% 23% 14.06 56% 0% 
SOEs 
Singapore: companies 
in which Temasek 
holds a greater than 5% 
stake (out of the 
companies in Table 2) 
17 65% 64% 13.57 91% 38% 
Hong Kong: Chinese 
SOEs in the HSI 
22 39% 38% 5.66 55% 31% 
Taiwan: companies in 
the Taiwan 50 Index in 
which the government 
owns 5% or more of 
the shares 
11 22% 22% 18% 56% 0% 
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Table 9C shows that Singapore again performs well by this metric. 
The top listed firms on the SGX, on average, have a higher proportion of 
independent board directors than their counterparts in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. Again, for Taiwan, the results may be affected by the ongoing 
structural changes in the corporate governance of listed companies. For 
Hong Kong, the proportion may be influenced by firms’ larger average 
board size. If we focus on SOEs, we again find that the companies in which 
Temasek has a substantial stake have, on average, a higher proportion of 
independent directors than the top Chinese SOEs listed in Hong Kong and 
the largest Taiwanese SOEs.  
Another useful comparison, which we make in Table 9D, concerns the 
nature of the chairmen in the three lists of companies. Unfortunately, owing 
to data limitations, we were unable to identify whether the chairmen in the 
Taiwanese sample were executive, non-executive, or independent directors, 
and we thus treat this as missing information.  
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TABLE 9D: NATURE OF THE CHAIRMAN 
 
Item (as in 
2013 annual 
report) 
Obs. Executive Non-
executive 
Independent 
director 
Chairman 
also CEO 
Overall 
Singapore: 50 
largest 
companies by 
market 
capitalization 
(see Table 2) 
48 15 16 17 5 (out of 50 
companies) 
Hong Kong: 
HSI 
component 
stocks 
50 37 11 2 13 
Taiwan: 
Taiwan 50 
Index 
component 
stocks 
50 . . . 9 
SOEs 
Singapore: 
companies in 
which 
Temasek holds 
a greater than 
5% stake (out 
of the 
companies in 
Table 2) 
17 0 9 8 0 
Hong Kong: 
Chinese SOEs 
in the HSI 
22 17 5 0 4 
Taiwan: 
companies in 
the Taiwan 50 
Index in which 
the 
government 
owns 5% or 
more of the 
shares 
11 . . . 1 
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From Table 9D, it seems that the top listed companies in Hong Kong 
provide a sharp contrast with Singapore in having chairmen who are largely 
executive directors, although our Hong Kong data differ little from similar 
data for S&P 500 firms in the U.S.215 Nonetheless, it is clear that Hong 
Kong and Singapore deviate greatly in this respect. There is a particularly 
large discrepancy between the companies in which Temasek holds a stake 
and the Chinese SOEs listed in Hong Kong. 
The limited data presented in this section are consistent with the three 
markets’ corporate governance rankings in Asia.216 Of course, it is one thing 
to examine the number and proportion of independent directors, and another 
to investigate whether those independent directors are truly independent and 
what function they serve in their companies. In addition, looking purely at 
the mean and median figures in the foregoing tables without examining the 
background of each market’s company law and market regulations may 
make for a misleading comparison.  
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this Article, the data clearly show that 
the companies in which Temasek has a stake perform well against both the 
top Chinese SOEs listed in Hong Kong and Taiwanese SOEs in certain 
corporate governance benchmarks. Thus, at least in the context of Greater 
China, Temasek and its portfolio of GLCs do seem to offer a positive model 
of maintaining both good governance and control over domestic industries. 
However, does this mean that the Temasek model is applicable to the 
reform of SOE corporate governance China? What factors contribute to 
Temasek’s relative good performance? What could be the weakness of the 
Temasek model? These questions will be addressed in the next part of the 
Article. 
 IV. LESSONS FROM THE TEMASEK MODEL  
What lessons can we learn from our empirical survey? The discussion 
thus far may offer a beacon of hope for reformers of SOEs in China or other 
Asian countries looking to improve the corporate governance of these huge 
firms. We have shown that Temasek operates like a competitive private 
investment company despite being wholly owned by the state. The Temasek 
Board, although comprising mainly Singaporeans, contains a few non-
Singaporeans and is primarily made up of independent or non-executive 
directors. Clear company goals are laid out in the Temasek Charter. 
Although the company’s CEO shares a close family relationship with the 
Prime Minister of Singapore, there is no obvious state interference in its 
 
 215 Velikonja, supra note 160, 864–65. 
 216 See CG Watch 2012, ASIAN CORP. GOVERNANCE ASS’N (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.acga-
asia.org/public/files/CG_Watch_2012_ACGA_Market_Rankings.pdf. 
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funds or management. In addition, the company’s operations are fairly 
global in nature, with offices and investments in various part of the world, 
although its main focus is Singapore and elsewhere in Asia.  
At the same time, it seems that Temasek has exerted a positive 
influence over the companies in which it has a stake in terms of 
encouraging them to have more independent or non-executive directors and 
to split the roles of the chairman and CEO. There is also no evidence to 
suggest that Temasek directly exerts control over the boards of any 
domestic company by imposing directors upon it. Although our survey 
covers only certain aspects of corporate governance, and we have no way of 
examining the actual influence that takes place behind the scenes, our data 
does show that the companies in which Temasek has a stake exhibit a 
higher standard of corporate governance than other top listed firms in 
Singapore. Our finding is also coherent with an earlier research in 2006 
showing that Singaporean GLCs have higher valuations and better 
corporate governance than a control group of non-GLCs.217 
However, before we become too optimistic, it is important that we 
understand some of the institutional factors behind the Temasek model. In 
this part, we will identify three main factors that may contribute to what 
Temasek is today: strong public governance to support self-regulation, 
foreign investment and competition, and the state’s desire to be a market 
leader. These factors will help us to determine whether the Temasek model 
can be transplanted elsewhere or is a special creature of Singapore that is 
unlikely to survive outside the confines of this city-state. 
 A. From Public Governance to Corporate Governance 
From our empirical data, we would argue that the Temasek model 
shows that good public governance218 might lead to good corporate 
governance. As discussed above, the public nature of SOEs may render it 
difficult for them to find a perfect fix with the existing corporate 
governance framework, given that the state is accountable to political 
institutions, due process, and its citizens. From this light, the improvement 
of corporate governance of SOEs must start from the state itself. Public 
governance may be an important factor to determine the governance of 
SOEs. However, as previously noted, Temasek’s operations are subject to 
 
 217 Ang & Ding, supra note 3, 85–86. 
 218 In this Article, the term “public governance” is used loosely to refer to governance of the public 
sector, as it is traditionally used in the areas of public or administration law. In the context of corporate 
law, the term may also be used to refer to the public-ness of modern corporations and their influence on 
society. See Hilary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1015 (2013). The term 
has also been use to describe transnational public governance systems. See Larry Cata Backer, Private 
Actors and Public Governance beyond the State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability 
Board, and the Global Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751 (2011). 
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very little regulation.219 Thus, the explanation for why Temasek is relatively 
free from political interference and operates like a competitive private 
enterprise may lie at least partly in the quality of public governance in 
Singapore.  
Singapore is known for its strong law enforcement against graft and 
corruption. It also took the number one spot in the World Bank’s Ease of 
Doing Business Ranking (out of 189 economies) in 2013 and 2014.220 If we 
compare Singapore with other Greater China jurisdictions, China was 
ranked a distant ninetieth in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
Ranking in 2014, Hong Kong ranked third, and Taiwan ranked 
nineteenth.221 Singapore is ranked second in the Global Competitiveness 
Index 2013–2014 issued by the World Economic Forum (with Hong Kong 
ranked seventh, Taiwan ranked twelfth, and China ranked twenty-ninth).222 
Singapore was ranked fifth in the world (and first among Asian countries) 
by Transparency International in its 2013 global Corruption Perceptions 
Index (with Hong Kong in fifteenth, Taiwan in thirty-sixth, and China in 
eightieth).223 Further, in the 2012 Rule of Law Index compiled by the World 
Justice Project, Singapore is ranked first in the world (out of ninety-seven 
economies) in terms of order and security, tenth in terms of regulatory 
enforcement, and nineteenth in terms of open government.224 All of this 
evidence demonstrates the strength of public sector governance in 
Singapore, which is naturally reflected in Temasek’s performance and 
likely to have an influence on the companies it owns. This may also support 
arguments that strong law enforcement of corporate and contract law may 
be a necessary step toward diffuse ownership and probably good corporate 
governance.225 
The government strives to ensure that the country is competitive on the 
global stage and is as corruption-free as possible, which creates an 
environment conducive to protecting Temasek and its GLCs from undue 
political interference. That environment allows Temasek to do its job of 
pursuing the long-term interests of the government as the ultimate 
shareholder. It also aligns Temasek’s (and the government’s) interests with 
the goals of good corporate governance. The long period of political 
 
 219 See supra Part II.C. 
 220 See Ease of Doing Business in Singapore, WORLD BANK, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/singapore. 
 221 Doing Business: Economy Rankings, WORLD BANK, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings. 
 222 WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013–2014 tbl 3 (2013), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf 
 223 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2013 (2013), 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/. 
 224 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX 2014 140 (2014), 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/files/wjp_rule_of_law_index_2014_report.pdf. 
 225 Roe, supra note 18, at 589–93. 
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stability that Singapore has enjoyed has also helped the company to devise 
long-term strategies and made the company less likely to suffer from short-
termism. Temasek’s GLCs thus have ample room to grow on their own, 
albeit with the state’s backing. In the case of Temasek, minimal regulation 
and self-regulation have not conflicted with good corporate governance 
outcomes.  
However, the strength of the Temasek model is also its weakness. The 
few black letter laws governing Temasek’s operations expose it to changes 
in the political climate. As noted, the Temasek model currently operates in 
an environment in which the government is generally effective and clean. 
Without such institutional support, minimal regulation and self-regulation 
could create fertile grounds for corruption and political interference. In 
Singapore, there has been no change in the government or the governing 
political party since the country’s independence in 1965. Thus, we have no 
evidence by which to determine whether a change in government would 
affect the operations of Temasek or its portfolio of GLCs. We also have no 
way of predicting what will happen in the future if Singapore does one day 
change its government. Temasek’s future is open to anyone’s speculation. 
Thus, although the stability of Singapore’s political environment may have 
been a major factor contributing to the successful performance of Temasek 
thus far, should the government change hands, no one can ensure that 
Temasek will continue to perform successfully in the future.  
We do not suggest that there should be no political influence or public 
oversight over a state-owned holding company like Temasek. When funds 
come from the government or a target company is associated with the 
public interest (e.g., a power company), a certain degree of public 
supervision is probably desirable. What we argue instead is that the self-
regulation of SOEs may not have positive effects if that self-regulation 
takes place in an environment lacking strong public governance.  
A natural question then is how much public regulation is optimal for 
SOEs to balance the need for public supervision with the need for corporate 
management flexibility. This is a question that is beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, the Temasek model offer key lessons regarding 
utilization of strong anti-corruption laws to reduce the chance of 
government officials interfering with the management of SOEs for personal 
gains or other inappropriate purposes and a vibrant economy help to create 
an environment in which SOEs can operate without excessive regulation or 
state intervention. Accordingly, creating a clean, effective, and competitive 
environment is likely to be more crucial than replicating the internal 
structure of Temasek. Then, the amount of public supervision that is 
necessary depends on the will of voters and the intention of the political 
institutions in a given country. 
In the case of Temasek, the answer to establishing effective 
supervision over operations in the absence of strong public supervision 
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appears to lie in assuring a relatively high ratio of independent directors on 
the boards of the companies in which it has a stake. In other words, by 
having more directors who have no affiliation with management or the 
majority shareholder, the model ensures that associated companies are less 
likely to be manipulated by political institutions, assuming that the 
independence of those directors is assured.  
Is it possible then to transplant the Temasek model to another country 
with black letter rules? The Temasek model is based on the respect, 
tolerance, and self-restraint the Singapore government exhibits. 
Unfortunately, those characteristics are not easily replicated. Thus, in 
general, we are inclined to take a negative view. On the one hand, it is 
unclear whether it is effective for a state to legislate clear goals for an SOE 
(such as the Temasek Charter) through black letter laws. It is one thing to 
state clear goals and guidance and another to pursue them efficiently in 
practice. On the other hand, there are issues that cannot be legislated 
directly, as doing so might reduce the flexibility of management. For 
example, if a law prescribes that an SOE must have more independent 
directors than other listed companies, SOEs might simply enlarge their 
boards to meet the numbers. Without other support such as an effective 
regime that can ensure the independence of an independent director, an 
obsession with numbers could prompt a company to hire individuals 
without merit, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the independent 
director regime and raising costs for the company. It is also debatable 
whether such qualities as ethical standards and professionalism can be 
legislated.  
In addition, Singapore is a small country with only one central 
government managing all matters, making it easier to control.226 In contrast, 
China is a much larger country that employs a governance structure that is 
much more sophisticated with a multilayered structure including central, 
provincial, and smaller governments. The sheer number of SOEs in China 
also poses challenges with one report estimating a figure of 155,000 SOEs 
in China controlled by central and local governments.227 Therefore, 
reforming China’s SOEs is a much more complicated task. Singapore’s 
Temasek model shows that public governance could be translated into good 
corporate governance for SOEs. Nonetheless, in China’s case, enhancing 
the public governance quality is itself a challenging task. There are too 
many other variables that may affect the reform of China’s SOEs. Simply 
transforming a state-owned holding company to be like Temasek without 
other supporting factors should render the path of “Temasekization” 
 
 226 Louise Lucas, Singapore Seeks to Export Own Model, FIN. TIMES (July 29, 2015), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2adc8d68-20a6-11e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79.html#axzz3hLMwP65q. 
 227 Fixing China Inc, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/china/ 
21614240-reform-state-companies-back-agenda-fixing-china-inc. 
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different from what Temasek is today. 
In sum, any government that wishes to transplant the Temasek model 
thus faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it must be willing to relinquish 
some degree of power to the management of a holding company or a SOE. 
It must resist the temptation to intervene whether for the sake of the public 
interest or merely as a power play. On the other, if the country lacks strong 
public governance standards and an effective enforcement regime against 
corruption, more stringent laws might be required (e.g., to ensure that the 
government could not intervene in the management of SOEs). However, 
depending on how they are drafted, having more black letter laws risks 
inviting more political wrestling or interference, which is likely in turn to 
weaken the flexibility of the Temasek model. Policymakers need to 
carefully consider these factors before attempting to transplant the Temasek 
model. 
 B. Foreign Activities and Market Forces 
Another important dimension to consider in evaluating Temasek’s 
influence on corporate governance is its considerable foreign investments 
and, in turn, its need to play by foreign rules. Although Temasek itself is 
not listed and has only one shareholder, it taps into the capital market by 
issuing Temasek Bonds and Temasek Euro-commercial paper notes,228 
which exposes it to a certain degree of market and investor pressure. 
Moreover, many companies in which Temasek holds a stake have 
substantial operations outside Singapore. For example, Singapore 
Telecommunications is the largest telecoms firm in Southeast Asia, and it 
also operates businesses in India and Australia. In addition, DBS—the 
largest bank in Southeast Asia by assets—also has operations in Hong 
Kong, China, Taiwan, and India.  
Having a stake in businesses outside Singapore may help to explain 
why Temasek behaves like an active investor akin to a private equity or 
hedge fund. As an active market player with considerable investments 
outside Singapore, Temasek must create a positive image and behave like a 
responsible market participant—rather than an entity pursuing political 
goals—to avoid a foreign backlash. It must also play by the rules of other 
countries and regions, most notably those of the United States, United 
Kingdom, and European Union, and may be held responsible to a target 
company or its shareholders or even held liable for its activities (depending 
on national law).229 Given Temasek’s wide range of investments throughout 
 
 228 See Temasek US$5 Billion ECP Programme, TEMASEK, http://www.temasek.com.sg/ 
investorrelations/temasekeurocommercialpaper.  
 229 Rose, supra note 11, at 102–04; Henry Ordower, The Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge 
Funds, and State Funds, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 296–98 (2010). 
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the world, the safest route for it to follow is to maintain a standard (e.g., 
corporate governance, conduct of business, internal compliance, etc.) 
sufficiently high to pass the test in most countries. For example, it was 
recently reported that Temasek’s relationship with Standard Chartered, in 
which Temasek holds an 18% stake, was under strain following the giant 
British bank’s settlement with the U.S. government over its eight-year 
breach of U.S. sanctions against Iran.230 As the USD 667 million penalty is 
dwarfed by a series of hefty fines and settlements paid to the U.S. 
government in recent times,231 it may not be the amount of the fine that has 
caused such discomfort but rather the bank’s flagrant breach of American 
law regarding Iran over a long period of time. If that is the case, it 
demonstrates Temasek’s propensity to stay low-profile.  
Our research proves the market to be an important force for improved 
corporate governance. The evidence suggests that Temasek’s thinking goes 
like this: if it must comply with foreign laws, then why should it treat its 
domestic portfolio any differently? Temasek also benefits as a shareholder 
by ensuring a good corporate governance structure, which increases its 
value in both Singapore and the other countries in which it has businesses 
interests. Thus, to a certain extent, the Singaporean state’s interests as a 
shareholder (via Temasek) and regulator are aligned through market 
competition.  
If, in contrast, a SOE does not have to comply with foreign market 
regulations because it has only domestic operations or interests, the SOE 
will face no foreign pressure to ensure that it maintains certain corporate 
governance standards. For example, China’s Central Huijin Investment 
Ltd., which controls all of Chinese largest banks and a number of state-
owned banks,232 does not invest in any foreign financial institutions. Thus, 
it faces much less foreign pressure (at least direct pressure) than Temasek. 
In this situation, the Temasekization of Central Huijin (if it happens) may 
not reach its intended effect. 
We do not mean to suggest that an SOE must venture into a foreign 
market or become listed on a foreign exchange, although many large 
Chinese SOEs have done both. As small as Singapore is, Singaporean firms 
are often forced to expand to overseas to generate higher return and growth. 
In contrast, Chinese SOEs may care less about foreign competition than 
 
 230 Patrick Jenkins & Martin Arnold, Bricks Come Loose from StanChart Tower Amid Whispering 
Campaign, FIN. TIMES (July 23, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2cf8b910-1278-11e4-a581-
00144feabdc0.html#slide0.  
 231 For example, in June 2014, BNP Paribas, a French bank, agreed to pay a fine of US$8.9 billion to 
the U.S. government and pleaded guilty to violating U.S. sanctions against Sudan. Kara Scannell, BNP 
Pleads Guilty to Sanctions Violations and Faces $8.9bn Fine, FIN. TIMES (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/db2daede-009c-11e4-9a62-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=uk# 
axzz3A4Ve2OLs. 
 232 See About Us, CENTRAL HUIJIN INVESTMENT LTD., https://perma.cc/7W9A-FKDA. 
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Singaporean SOEs given the size of their domestic market and the clout 
they have at home. What we are arguing is that the Temasek model might 
lose its charm if Temasek or the GLCs only target the domestic market. 
Thus, foreign investment is another institutional factor that must be 
considered in assessing whether the Temasek model can be transplanted 
elsewhere. 
 C. Be a National Champion in a Good Way  
Another important lesson to be learned from the Temasek model is 
that the state can send a signal to the market that good corporate governance 
is expected. In other words, the state can lead by example. Temasek also 
provides an example of the desire for national champions co-existing with 
good corporate governance practices. Instead of competing to be the biggest 
in the domestic context, Singapore’s Temasek and its portfolio of GLCs 
compete to be the ones with higher standards. This Article does not judge 
whether the “kiasuism” (i.e., the social attitude of being afraid of losing 
out)233 is a good thing or bad thing for a society. Nonetheless, this Article 
suggests that the cultural background might offer part of the reasons why 
the Temasek model results in higher corporate governance standards for 
SOEs in Singapore. 
By leading by example, Temasek and its portfolio of GLCs raise the 
bar for other firms and provide a benchmark for institutional and individual 
investors in the market. We do not wish to suggest that having more 
independent directors (or fewer executive directors) is an absolute good in 
terms of stock prices or firm profitability. That is a subject for further 
theoretical or empirical research. We also do not propose that a country 
should implement laws requiring SOE boards to comprise primarily 
independent and/or non-executive directors. However, what we can learn 
from Temasek is that instead of lagging behind private enterprises, SOEs 
can be leaders in good corporate governance.  
A related issue is whether the state can be an activist investor like 
many private equity funds seeking to change the direction of a target 
company. Temasek claims that it is an active but not activist investor,234 
though this does not necessarily mean that it does not attempt to have a 
voice in a company’s management decisions beyond selling its stake. There 
are reports of Temasek sitting down with the management of an associated 
company informally (rather than confronting it in a general meeting) when 
it feels that the company is moving in the wrong direction.235 In addition, 
Temasek has sometimes attempted to improve a target company’s 
 
 233 See supra note 47. 
 234 Supra note 8. 
 235 Supra note 8. 
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performance by launching a joint venture. For example, in 2006, Temasek 
formed a joint venture with E.SUN Financial Holdings to improve that 
company’s corporate governance, risk management systems, and offering 
of financial products in the hopes of securing a long-term investment,236 
although it walked away from the deal in 2008.237 While the reasons for 
Temasek’s termination of the joint venture remain unclear, E.SUN 
increased its number of independent directors: from two in 2006 to four in 
2008.238 That may not mean much, but it is a sign that Temasek appears to 
be interested in improving the corporate governance standards of target 
companies even when it does not have majority control. 
How much a state should behave like an activist investor is open to 
question. In the domestic context, taking an activist role may open up a 
channel for the government to interfere with private businesses without due 
process. Many SOEs in fact consider excessive political interference to be a 
common problem. In addition, the state has other regulatory tools at its 
disposal to force through changes if necessary. Thus, there is no particular 
need for the state to evade public oversight by being an activist investor.  
In the foreign investment context, a sovereign wealth fund might face 
significant difficulties if it began behaving too much like an activist 
investor in pursuing changes within a company. Such activism by an arm of 
a foreign state would be very likely to attract the criticism of the host 
country and invite concerns over possible threats to the public interest or 
even national security. Therefore, institutions such as Temasek are probably 
better off staying under the radar, which may explain Temasek’s lack of 
activism while continuing to trade actively. However, it is interesting to 
consider how a sovereign wealth fund like Temasek might behave like an 
activist investor in pushing for corporate reforms in the future. 
Another question of interest is whether Temasek and its portfolio of 
GLCs champion corporate social responsibility or other benchmarks such as 
gender equality on the board. At present, we have no evidence to show that 
the companies in which Temasek has a stake have more women on their 
boards than the other large companies listed on the SGX.239 It is also 
 
 236 See Press Release, E.SUN Fin. Holding Co. Ltd., Yùshān jīn kòng yǔ dànmǎxī kònggǔ cèlüè 
liánméng (玉山金控與淡馬錫控股策略聯盟) [Yushan Temasek Holdings and Strategic Alliances] 
(Mar. 14, 2006), http://www.esunbank.com.tw/about/165.board. 
 237 See Dànmǎxī qiú qù yùshān jīn zhuǎn liàn mógēn shì dān lì (淡馬錫求去 玉山金轉戀摩根士丹
利) [Temasek Seeks to Send Yushan Kim to Morgan Stanley], TÁIWĀN PÍNGGUǑ RÌBÀO (台灣蘋果日報) 
[APPLE DAILY TAIWAN] (Mar. 4, 2008), http://www.appledaily.com.tw/ 
appledaily/article/finance/20080304/30318132/. 
 238 Annual Reports, E.SUN FIN. HOLDING CO., LTD, http://www.esunfhc.com.tw/ir/ 
about_report.info. 
 239 Of the fifty top companies on the SGX listed in Table 2, those in which Temasek has a stake 
seem to have a slightly higher average number of women on their boards than other companies (1.06 
women as opposed to 0.67). However, we found no statistically significant relationship between a 
Temasek stake and a company having more women on its board than the number of women on boards of 
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unclear whether those companies are more environmentally friendly than 
other firms. Temasek has also not followed in the steps of Norway with 
regard to disclosing its voting intention after or even before voting takes 
place in company general meetings.240 It will be interesting to investigate 
whether Temasek will follow Norway’s decision in the future. 
 V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this Article uses Singapore’s Temasek Holdings as a 
case study to examine the corporate governance of SOEs in the Asian 
context. Our data does lend support to arguments that SOEs could still 
enjoy good corporate governance if the state is both willing to relax control 
and determined to lead by example. These data thus offer hope that 
Temasek can serve as a road map for China as it seeks to reform its vast 
array of SOEs. 
However, Temasek’s performance in terms of improving the corporate 
governance of its invested firms is not a product of strict legal requirements, 
but more likely the result of the healthy organizational culture entrenched 
by the government’s determination to keep its hands off investment 
decisions. This Article identifies several institutional factors that help to 
explain Temasek’s achievements and the empirical evidence we have 
collected. On the one hand, Singapore has a strong record of good public 
governance and shows no inclination to exert excessive political control 
over SOEs, which has allowed Temasek to pursue the long-term interests of 
the government as the ultimate shareholder. It has also served to align 
Temasek’s (and the government’s) interests with the goals of good 
corporate governance. On the other hand, Temasek has considerable foreign 
investments, and accordingly must play by the rules of a range of foreign 
countries in addition to adhering to domestic regulations.  
A possible explanation for our empirical finding that the companies in 
which Temasek hold a stake have higher quality corporate governance than 
other firms may thus be that the safest way for Temasek to show foreign 
governments and investors that it cares about its businesses is to hold these 
businesses against high standards. Taken together, these factors indicate 
that it would be difficult to transplant the Temasek model to other countries, 
including China, without replicating the underlying environment in which 
Temasek currently thrives. Nonetheless, this Article shows that if 
politicians resist the temptation to interfere, a sovereign wealth fund or SOE 
can be a properly-managed market leader. 
 
other large companies in 2013.  
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